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FOREWORD 
This report has been prepared for the Strategic Analysis in Science and Technology Unit 
(SASTJ of the Directorate-General for Science, Research and Development of the 
Commission of the European Communities. SAST activities are part of the MONITOR 
Programme which aims to identify new directions and priorities for Community research and 
technological development (RTDJ policy and to help show more clearly the relationship 
between RTD policy and other Community policies. 
For questions already identified as of interest for the development of Community policy, 
SAST projects provide an investigation of the perspectives opened up by science and 
technology. SAST projects thus serve as an input to the process of policy formulation. In 
the case of the SAST project to which this report contributes, "The needs and possibilities 
for cooperation between selected advanced developing countries and the Community in the 
field of science and technology", the context of policy questions includes the evolving 
economic relations between the Community and these countries, the interest to the 
Community of promoting international cooperation in science and technology with various 
types of countries, and the Community's role in European science and technology. 
This report is one of a set of country studies carried out for the project. The set comprises 
the Republic of Korea, Thailand, other ASEAN countries, the People's Republic of China, 
India, Brazil and Mexico. An overall strategic review will also be available in 1992. 
It should be borne in mind in reading the country studies that the fieldwork on which they 
are based was carried out almost entirely in the country concerned. The points of view of 
European industrialists/researchers/policy makers were not explicitly sought for this part of 
the project. (They will be sought as part of the work for the overall strategic review.) 
SAST presents this report as a stimulus to reflection and debate within the European 
Community on the best strategies to adopt towards a group of increasingly important 
countries. It must be stressed, however, that the orientation and content of reports 
prepared for SAST cannot be taken as indicating the considered opinion of policy advisors 
within the Commission services. 
NOTE 
China is used in this report as a synonym 
for the People's Republic of China 
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INTRODUCTION AND READERS' GUIDE 
Charting the most appropriate path towards greater future collaboration in science and 
technology between China and the European Commission at the present moment is a task 
fraught with difficulties and uncertainties. The events of June 1989, their impact on 
China's international relations, and the resulting uncertainty about the country's stability 
and the future direction of policy are the most obvious complicating factors in this 
equation. 
China entered the last year of the 1980s having accomplished a great deal through its 
much heralded reform process. Though the problems of reform were growing daily more 
difficult, the country had behind it ten years of solid economic growth and largely positive 
social change. This had been accompanied and heavily influenced by unprecedented levels 
of interaction with the world economy due to the Open Door policy. A series of sweeping 
reforms to the S& T system, also involving extensive international contact and exchange, 
had generated significant gains. More importantly, the S&T system exhibited a huge 
potential for making an even greater contribution to China's modernization drive in the 
future as well as marking out China as a force to be reckoned with in international S& T. 
However, the situation following June 1989 when the government used military force to 
suppress the pro-democracy movement has thrown open to question the durability of these 
achievements and the future possibilities for continued change and reform. Opinions are 
widely divided between those who fear a permanent retreat from reform is underway and 
those who believe that reform has been slowed but not reversed and that after some time 
forward movement will become much more visible. 
We tend toward the latter view and feel reasonably optimistic about the future prospects 
for renewed reform in the medium term. Two reasons for ta.king this position are of direct 
relevance to our concerns. Firstly, the current leadership has continued to stress the need 
to further develop China's S& T capabilities through increased domestic investment and 
enhanced international contact; while secondly, it has likewise emphasized the continuation 
of the favourable conditions governing foreign investment and international technology 
transfer. 
These aspects of current Chinese thinking relate directly to the explicit interests of the 
SAST project. China, of course is a very large and a very poor country. In many respects 
it fulfils all the criteria to qualify as a developing country and therefore deserves to be 
treated as such in terms of the provision of aid and technical assistance on developmental 
and humanitarian grounds. 
There are however other dimensions to China that must also be acknowledged. The 
country possesses formidable S& T capabilities and resources, it enjoys significant cost 
advantages in a number of sectors, it oversees a potentially vast market and, most 
importantly, it is fully prepared and capable of exploiting vigorously its domestic and 
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international pos1t1on to its own advantage. These characteristics make China an 
appropriate country with which to pursue S& T and industrial collaboration according to the 
criteria of mutual benefit. 
This is the perspective adopted by this report. We have not set out to identify areas or 
fields where China needs technical assistance or aid-oriented development support for S& T. 
China's needs in this area are very great. China is the largest aid recipient for many 
agencies and countries including the EC, UNDP and the U.S. It was not our brief to focus 
on this aspect of EC relations with China. Rather, we explored, through our interviews and 
subsequent analysis, issues relating to S& T collaboration between the EC and China based 
on the concept of mutual benefit. 
With this focus in mind, Part I of this report contains a strategic review of the key issues 
impinging upon the prospects for S&T collaboration with China. We begin in Sections 1 
- 3 by setting the context for assessing the prospects for S& T collaboration with China by 
first reviewing briefly China's economic performance, the success and failures of its reform 
programme, and the current status of China's policy toward foreign investment. Sections 
4 and 5 review key aspects of S& T reform and its effects while Section 6 discusses 
China's current initiatives to develop its high technology R&D capabilities. Section 7 
presents proposals for the pursuit of greater S& T collaborative linkages between the 
Community and China. 
Part II contains the "decision base" for this case study and consists of 11 sections 
containing background information and analysis of China's economy and its S& T system. 
Sections 1 - 5 cover various aspects of the recent performance of the economy and the 
economic reforms programme and its impacts. The remaining sections focus on various 
aspects of the S& T system with Section 6 describing the S& T policy institutions and 
policy-making process, Sections 7 and 8 on the S&T labour force and the R&D system. 
Section 9 reviews available information on S& T expenditure, Section 1 0 assesses China's 
international S& T relations and Section 11 focuses specifically on the development of 
China's high technology capabilities. Five annexes provide additional information. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
1 . During the 1980s, China undertook an ambitious programme of reform that generated 
considerable economic benefits and gained acceptance of the country into the 
international community of nations. However, the events of June 1989 caused 
severe damage to China's international relations that are only just beginning to be 
repaired. And though it is unlikely the government will soon adopt a more relaxed 
political posture, there are good reasons to believe that forward movement of the 
reform process will resume in the medium term. 
2. By any measure, China's economic accomplishments during the period of reform in the 
1980s were impressive. During 1981-1987, real GNP grew annually by 9.8 per 
cent (reaching $329 billion in 1988) while real industrial output grew by 12.8 per 
cent a year over that period. Total trade rose from $44.2 billion in 1980 to $113.9 
billion in 1989 (of which the Community accounted for 8.5 per cent) while exports 
increased at an annual rate of 16.8 per cent from $9.8 billion to $39.4 billion, 
bringing the country to 16th place in the world league of exporters (up from 32nd 
in 1979). 
3. Foreign investment rose substantially as well due to the attractions of an expanding 
domestic economy, a more hospitable investment climate and the country's 
potential as a low cost exporter of labour-intensive products. For the 1980-88 
period, real new foreign investment totalled $15 to $18 billion (of which Europe 
accounted for 3.4 per cent) spread across 22,000 joint ventures and wholly foreign 
owned subsidiaries. Moreover, through foreign investment and its own arms-length 
purchases, China absorbed $27 billion worth of imported technology between 1980 
and 1989, with much of this coming from Japan and the U.S. 
4. Partly because of the success of the reform programme and partly because the reform 
process didn't go far enough, China began to experience growing economic 
difficulties by the mid-1 980s. These included high inflation, rising indebtedness, 
s-erious raw material shortages, major transport bottlenecks and the increasingly 
high costs of maintaining an unreformed and still massively inefficient state-run 
industrial sector. A severe austerity programme was imposed in 1989 (and is still 
in force) to tackle some of these problems. Inflation has been brought under 
control but many of the other worries will continue to bedevil the economy for 
some time to come. In 1990, China spent more money subsidising prices and 
bailing out inefficient state firms than the total budget for defence, education, 
science and public health. 
5. Despite the current economic difficulties, the government has indicated clearly that it 
remains committed to achieving further progress in two areas that are of direct 
interest. The first involves improving the climate for foreign investment so as to 
attract greater inward flows of foreign capital and technology in the future. This 
has become necessary because of the damage done to investor confidence and to 
China's standing with the international financial community by the events of June 
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1989. A variety of long awaited measures have now been introduced including the 
passage of important new laws giving protection to intellectual property rights and 
software and easing the operational climate for foreign firms. These are positive 
steps and more changes are expected - though there are still grounds for keeping 
up the pressure for further improvement. 
6. The strengthening of the government's public commitment to the "Open Door" policy 
could create genuine opportunties for European enterprises who understand how 
to do business with the Chinese. The prospects are particularly bright for firms 
operating in high technology sectors, for those able to put together 
technology-intensive projects in mainstream manufacturing sectors and for those 
able to guarantee that a majority of output will be exported. The opportunity is 
also there for the Community to play a more active role in promoting an expansion 
of European involvement in technology-intensive projects in China. Particular 
attention could be paid to developing joint ventures with the new forms of 
"scientific enterprise" that the government is promoting. 
7. Beyond this, there is acknowledgement that China's reliance on Japan and the US as its 
main sources of industrial technology has to be moderated. Japanese reluctance 
to transfer technology was a particular source of irritation. There could be 
considerable trading advantages on offer for European firms prepared to undertake 
projects involving the effective transfer of technology. Again there is a role here 
for the Community to play. 
8. Second, the leadership has continued to stress the need to further develop China's S& T 
capabilities through increased domestic investment in R, D & D and enhanced 
contact with the internationalS& T community. This commitment has been a staple 
feature of China's development policy since the mid 1980's as the leadership 
became convinced that success of the modernization programme was critically 
dependent upon China's ability to assimilate, generate and diffuse science and 
technology much more effectively than it had in the past. 
9. Beginning in 1985, a pervasive reform of the S& T system was initiated in order to 
better link R&D to production and in general to make the whole system more 
market-oriented. This is no small matter since the Chinese S& T system involves 
approximately 8700 R&D institutions ( 1044 of which are directly under state 
control and form the core of the R&D network), over 600 universities and some 
9.66 million S&T personnel, 800,000 of which are directly engaged in R&D. 
Despite the size of the task, significant gains were achieved by the reform that 
both highlighted the huge potential of S& T in China as well as marking out the 
country as a force to be reckoned with in international S& T. 
10. The most important dimension of the recent emphasis given to S& T development by 
the government has been the vigourous campaign to develop and strengthen 
China's high technology capabilities via targeted R&D projects and applied 
technology development, the launching of new institutional innovations, and the 
acquisition of knowledge through international collaboration. 
11 . The activities undertaken have begun to create the necessasry starting conditions for 
rapid high tech development in China. If these R&D efforts are pursued in the 
1990s with the same energy that accompanied their launch prior to June 1989, 
these could translate into a broad range of opportunities for collaboration in R&D 
and technology commercialization with China. Chinese officials interviewed felt 
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that these high tech programmes could serve as an ideal base for EC S& T 
collaborative initiatives. 
12. Our judgement is that it is a propitious moment for the Community to explore further 
the development of a wide array of S& T and industrial collaborations with China. 
The benefits to Europe could be considerable and would derive from China's 
substantial pockets of world class R&D, its large S& T manpower base, ultimately 
enormous domestic market, and the potential for serving as a platform for the 
regional and global export of technology- and labour-intensive products. From a 
strict commercial perspective, however, it has to be acknowledged that benefits 
to Europe would only begin to flow strongly in the medium term. 
13. The Community now enjoys a potential position of relative strength vis a vis China. 
The country's bargaining power remains weakened by the events of June 1989. 
The leadership recognizes that it continues to require good access to foreign 
knowhow and invesstment funds and sees Europe as a valuable counter to the 
Japanese and Americans as a source of technology transfer. It also believeS that 
international collaboration in S& T is an important tool for developing its own 
domestic capabilities. 
14. There were clear and strong expressions of interest on the part of the Chinese S& T 
leadership in the pursuit of further discussions with the Community to develop S& T 
collaborative initiatives. However some problems will need to be confronted 
directly if this opportunity is taken up. Chinese S& T officials will push strongly for 
being allowed to participate in the Framework Programme. Some will also find it 
difficult to operate under conditions of "mutual benefit" since they are accustomed 
to working in a dependent aid-dominated relationship with the international S& T ' 
community. The Chinese are also tough negotiators. None of these issues should 
present insurmountable obstacles. 
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1.1. THE MAIN ELEMENTS OF REFORM AND ITS ECONOMIC 
CONSEQUENCES 
Strategic Review 
China embarked on a process of far-reaching economic and institutional reform in 1978 that 
aimed to double 1980 gross output by 1990; double it again by the year 2000; and finally 
to reach the per capita income levels of moderately developed economies by the middle of 
the next century. The reforms involved the phased introduction of fundamental changes 
on previous practice in four interlinked areas affecting every facet of Chinese economic 
activity. 
Firstly, through the introduction of the "responsibility system" in the productive sectors, 
workers, managers and enterprises were given greater autonomy and offered incentives to 
increase output, improve quality and lower costs. Second, attempts were made to reform 
the price and wage system in order to give the market a greater role in determining the 
prices of commodities, products and wages in both the agricultural and industrial sectors. 
The third component of the reform programme was the widely heralded "Open Door" policy 
which involved an unprecedented opening up of the economy to foreign investment, 
technology transfer and international trade. Finally, the fourth area of reform involved a 
fundamental restructuring of the country's science and technology system. This was 
necessary because the long term success of the modernization programme was seen as 
critically dependent upon China's ability to assimilate, generate and diffuse science and 
technology much more effectively than it had in the past. 
1.1.1. INITIAL WAVE OF REFORM LEADS TO MAJOR IMPROVEMENTS 
IN ALL ASPECTS OF ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 
During the 1 980s, the implementation of China's reform programme resulted in 
considerable economic gain for the country as a whole. For example, during 1981-1987, 
real GNP achieved an annual growth rate of 9.8 per cent, underpinned by annual increases 
in real gross industrial and agricultural output averaging 12.8 per cent and 7.2 per cent 
respectively, and a 9.5 per cent annual growth in real national income. By the late 1980s, 
rural reforms had created nearly 1 9 million township enterprises, whose dynamic growth 
powered the expansion of the whole economy and whose output in 1 987 exceeded that 
of agriculture itself. 
Trade performance was similarly impressive. Total trade grew from $44.2 billion in 1980 
to $113.9 billion in 1989 while exports increased at an annual rate of 16.8 per cent from 
$9.8 billion to $39.4 billion. By 1989, Hong Kong was China's major trading partner with 
21 .2 per cent of two way trade followed by Japan with 12.7 per cent, the EC with 8.5 per 
cent and the USA with 6. 7 per cent. 
Levels of foreign investment rose significantly as well as foreign firms were attracted by 
the (reform-driven) expansion of the domestic economy, a more hospitable investment 
climate and the country's potential as a low cost exporter of labour-intensive products. For 
the 1980-88 period, real new foreign investment totalled $15 to $18 billion ( $2.4 billion 
in 1988) and was bound up in the activities of some 12,000 joint equity ventures, 8000 
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JOint production operations and 1 500 wholly foreign owned subsidiaries. 1 As in trade, 
Hong Kong is China's leading investment partner accounting for 70.8 per cent of all 
approved projects involving foreign partners between 1978 and 1988 followed by the U.S. 
with 8.5 per cent ($2.4 billion) Japan with 4.7 per cent ($1.3 billion) and the EC with 3.9 
per cent ($987 million). 
1 An equally s1zeable inflow of Imported technology (embodied and disembodied) accompan1ed th1s mward 
flow of foreign investment funds Over the 1980-89 period, the government claims an expenditure for imported 
technology of $27 billion spread across 27,000 contracts. 
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1.2. INCREASING ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES LEADS TO STALLED 
REFORMS, AUSTERITY AND RETRENCHMENT 
Despite these successes, some very serious problems emerged during the implementation 
of the reforms, particularly in the post-1985 period, that eventually led to the present 
economic and political crisis. Simply put, the reform process floundered on the inability 
(and often unwillingness) of the economy, bureaucracy, enterprises and individuals to cope 
with the enormous pressures for radical change that were placed upon them by the 
leadership. 
These problems became visible at both the macro and micro level. At the macro level, the 
most serious was undoubtedly the emergence of an unprecedentedly high rate of inflation 
that went from virtually zero in 1978 to an average of 10.3 per cent by 1985 and growing 
sharply to more than 20 per cent in 1988 and close to 30 per cent in 1989 before the 
imposition of draconian credit restrictions which should at least halve it by the end of 
1990. Moreover, the unbridled demand for consumption goods and decentralization of 
control over imports stemming from the reforms resulted in a ballooning of the country's 
foreign trade deficit to $14.19 billion in 1985. 
At the micro level, rural reform, after some early successes, ran into severe problems. On 
the one hand the pace of reform was deemed to be too slow while at the same time the 
rapid growth of township enterprises through the mid-1 980s had placed the economy under 
enormous inflationary pressures. In the urban areas, apart from some successes linked to 
the establishment of high tech industries, it proved far more difficult than expected to 
implement even the most basic reforms among the vast majority of state-run productive 
enterprises. 
Inevitably, reform of the price and incentive structure proved the most problematic with the 
consequence that the prices of most industrial products in 1 988 still do not reflect their 
true scarcity value, while many state-run industries remained hopelessly inefficient. As a 
result, serious shortages of raw materials developed, major transport bottle-necks emerged 
and huge stockpiles of unsaleable, poor quality goods piled up through the latter half of 
1987 and all through 1988. 
1.2.1. ECONOMIC AUSTERITY AND SLOWING OF THE REFORM 
PROCESS 
By mid 1988, it was clear that the problems faced by the Chinese economy were so 
widespread and fundamental that they could no longer be passed off as purely transitional. 
A political struggle ensued within the government between those advocating the hastening 
and deepening of the reform process as the only way to maintain forward progress and 
those calling for a return to centralization and strict control in order to reduce inflation and 
bring the economy back into line. 
The net outcome of that phase of the struggle was that a strict austerity drive was 
instituted in early 1989 involving severe credit restraints, an abrupt slow-down in capital 
investment, and a sharp cutback on imports. While this austerity programme had some 
impact on the economic front, it exacerbated existing political tensions particularly in the 
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cities. This unsustainable situation was ultimately resolved by the government's use of 
force in Tiananmen Square in June 1989. 
Since then the economy has continued to struggle both with the restraining effects of the 
austerity programme and the continued imbalances caused by the earlier reforms and 
deep-rooted structural weakness. The availability of credit at all levels continues to be 
sharply reduced - with particularly severe (and intended) effects on the performance of the 
rural enterprise sector; in the urban sector state-run producers are being favoured over 
private and semi-autonomous firms in terms of access to investment funds, inputs, foreign 
exchange, etc.; the government is now relying more heavily on central planning to direct 
the economy; and, perhaps most importantly the pace of price reform appears to have been 
slowed sharply- at least for the time being. 
It is virtually impossible to judge at this stage how long the current period of retrenchment 
will persist in China. Certainly, the struggle between different factions within the 
government leadership continues. Some argue that these conditions will remain for some 
time; others are more optimistic. However, there are two areas where it is clear that the 
Chinese government is committed to pushing forward and will not be reversing the reform 
process in a major way - the Open Door policy with regard to foreign investment and the 
strengthening of the country's S& T capacity. Both of these elements are critical to our 
interest in this strategic review because of the direct link and possibilities thus generated 
for mutually beneficial collaboration. We discuss direct foreign investment first in the next 
section and then move on to S& T issues. 
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1.3. THE "OPEN DOOR" AND POLICIES TOWARD FOREIGN INVESTMENT 
The one area of policy where Chinese leaders avow there has been little change is in 
respect to the Open Door towards foreign investment and trade. Since June 1989 they 
have been constantly at pains to insist that nothing has changed and that the door is still 
open. The leadership feels the need to reiterate the openness of the Chinese economy to 
foreign investment for two obvious reasons. 
First, given China's relative technological backwardness even after 1 0 years of reform, 
further pursuit of the modernization/rapid growth strategy will still rely heavily on access 
to foreign investment, technology and aid. The promised improvements in living standards 
(on which the regime's continued legitimacy now depends more than ever) simply cannot 
be delivered without massive inward flows of foreign capital and technology - particularly 
given the straitened circumstances of the current austerity programme .. Second, and more 
importantly in the short run, the authorities have to make clear to the international finance 
community, that China is still a safe haven for foreign capital so that it can reach an 
accommodation on its debt repayment problem in the next year or two. 
As documented in Part 2, between January 1987 and June 1989, there had been a boom 
in foreign investment. By June 1989 the number of contracts signed grew by 400 per cent 
and their unit value by 67 per cent over the totals accumulated from 1979-86. In the first 
half of 1989, foreign investment was up by nearly 50 per cent. A major reason for this 
boom was that after 5 or so very difficult years, foreign firms had finally begun to have 
trust and confidence in the stability of the Open Door policy. 
This confidence and trust, particularly that of Western and Japanese businessmen, was 
severely shaken by the shock of Tiananmen. This damage was reflected in a downturn of 
at least 25 per cent in the level of new commitments over the last six months of 1 989. 
Moreover there is some evidence that these uncertainties have continued to restrain new 
investment activity during that year as it is reported that in the first six months of 1990, 
the foreign exchange value of negotiated foreign investments had in fact dropped by nearly 
32 per cent. 2 
It is interesting to note that unlike their Western and Japanese counterparts, Taiwanese and 
Hong Kong entrepreneurs carried on investing in China with the value and number of 
Taiwanese funded projects doubling in the first six months of 1990. These investment 
actions are, however, of only marginal interest to the leadership since they primarily 
involved low tech projects not much in favour with Beijing. They were far more concerned 
by the apparent downturn in investment activity on the part of U.S., Japanese and 
European firms 
2 There has also been a sharp falloff in foreign investment in capital intensive and high technology projects 
in Guangdong Province which encompasses many of China's most favoured economic zones and currently 
accounts for 43 per cent of all foreign investment. By the end of March, 1990, new investment projects were 
down by 20 per cent from a year earlier. Shanghai City reported an even more precipitous decline in new 
investment projects over the same period. 
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1.3.1. CONTRADICTORY SIGNALS AND ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES 
In response to these difficulties the government has been taking steps and sending out 
signals designed to restore confidence. One response has been the more rapid approval 
of export-oriented projects already in the pipeline. Others involved buying up unsold 
inventory from highly visible joint ventures (a practice now stopped) and continued 
insistence that the special economic zones, Open Cities and the open province of Hainan 
Island would still offer preferential terms for foreign investment. A new policy announced 
in January 1990 and related to these special zones was the first time authorization that 
land in these areas can be leased to foreign firms. 
Also related, the government has, in recent months, launched what in effect amounts to 
a new development strategy focussing on the eastern part of the country in the Pudong 
area that will be heavily dependent on attracting in new foreign investment. 3 The original 
"coastal development strategy" is discussed in Part 2. 
Most importantly, a major new piece of legislation relating to joint ventures was passed in 
April 1990 which gave guarantees against expropriation and eliminated any requirement 
that joint ventures be limited to a fixed time period. This was a surprise development 
because the government had previously been adamantly opposed to such measures. 
Of a surprise has been the even more recent (September 1990) decision by the State 
Council to implement the long awaited Copyright Law which for the first time grants 
protection for intellectual works published in foreign countries if there is a reciprocal 
agreement in that country of if the country is a member of an international intellectual 
property convention or institution of which China is a member. Protection is granted to all 
forms of work and is extended for 50 years after the death of the original inventor. 4 
Further legislation relating to the protection of software is expected soon. 
The passage of these two measures, along with the promised legislation on software 
significantly improves the foreign investment climate in China and goes some way towards 
meeting the demands of the West and Japan for further reform in the critical areas of 
foreign investment and intellectual property rights. These moves along with the others 
mentioned above allowing land leasing to foreigners are indicative both of the degree of 
3
• The Pudong New Development Zone is in the eastern part of China, includes an area of 350 kms with one 
m1llion inhabitants and covers Shanghai and a large portion of the Yangtze R1ver regions. There 1s a three-phase 
plan stretching 20 years into the next century with the first infrastructure phase taking place over the next ten 
years and costing $1.7 billion. A whole set of new policies more favourable to foreign investment than those 
currently in place anywhere in China are being formulated. The intended proJects will cover export processing 
activities, petro-chemicals and energy and pollution-free high tech industries with most expected to be established 
by means of foreign investment. Pilkington's, the U.K. glass producer has already established a float glass joint 
venture there. See for example Elizabeth Chang, "The East is Ready", Far Eastern Economic Rev1ew, 31st May 
1990. 
•. Additional provisions of the law cover the distribution of control over royalties which has been another 
sticking point in Ch~na's relations with other countries on this issue. These are now in hne w1th the requirements 
demanded by the U.S., Europe and Japan. 
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difficulty the government was having in attracting new foreign investment post-Tiananmen 
and of its earnest intention to overcome these problems.6 
These are significant measures designed, as indicated above, to demonstrate to the outside 
world (particularly foreign banks and aid agencies) that it is still possible for foreign 
enterprises to do business in China. However, the leadership's efforts to create a positive 
impression by these moves are tending to be undermined somewhat by the downstream 
actions of officials and agencies less visible to foreign observers. 6 Moreover there is still 
considerable suspicion that new legislation mentioned above will not actually have very 
much impact in practice. 7 Compounding these difficulties, foreign firms are, of course, 
also subject to the chill winds of the generalized downturn in domestic demand and the 
inadequacies of an overstretched infrastructure. 
1.3.2. DESPITE POliCY CONTRADICTIONS, THE DOOR IS STILL OPEN 
Many foreign firms have until recently been adopting a wait and see position with regards 
to their future investment plans in China. There are however signs of an upturn in interest 
and activity on the part of foreign firms. One of the most recent examples of this was the 
November 1990 announcement by VW that it intends to significantly expand its 
involvement in the domestic production of motor vehicles - with the aim of producing 
1 50,000 cars per year by 1996.8 From the Chinese perspective this is undoubtedly 
encouraging and they have gone to considerable lengths to publicize these successes. 
However, with the possible exception of a rise in new investment "commitments" in 
Guangdong and Guangzhou province, there is clearly no evidence yet to suggest a 
For a recent review of the current situation with regard to related areas such as technology transfer 
contracts see the comprehensive discussion in Arthur Wolff, "Technology Transfer to the People's Republic of 
China", International Journal of Technology Management, Vol 4., Nos 4-5, 1989. 
6
• For example, despite being eased on specific projects, bureaucratic obstacles to new investments and 
expansion plans have in fact increased substantially in recent months. Foreign firms are also being deliberately 
squeezed on the credit side and being pressured to increase their capital contribution. See Richard Brechert, "The 
End of Investment's Wonder Years," China Business Review, January-February 1990. 
Moreover, a variety of show-case joint ventures in the motor vehicle and consumer goods sectors were operating 
at least through the end of 1989 at well below capacity because of shrinking demand and a clamp-down on 
government spending while the infrastructure in certain foreign investment zones is severely constrained at 
precisely the time the government is cutting back on investment. 
7
• These suspicions have lead to a recent rise in tensions between the US and China over the trade issue. The 
US trade deficit with China in 1990 was $10.4 billion, up from $6.2 billion in 1989 and third largest after Japan 
and Taiwan. There is a remote possibility that the Congress will revoke China's "most favoured nation" trade 
status as a result of its displeasure over slow progress by the Chinese over intellectual property issues and 
irritation over charges that China is engaged in "dumping" in garments and other sectors. At the very least, action 
may well be taken under Section 301 of the Omnibus Trade Bill of 1988 if conditions do not improve. 
8
• Earlier in 1990, Courtaulds announced a $4 million joint venture to produce paints (the first such U.K. 
investment since June 1 989), while in mid- 1 990, there was a renewed commitment from Philips of Holland to 
continue pushing forward with its sizeable programme of manufacturing investment - $200 million in nine 
manufacturing and assembly joint ventures in consumer electronics. Perhaps just as significant is a recent 
announcement by a major Japanese chain of clothing stores to establish a chain of menswear stores in China with 
the first opening mid-1991. 
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sustained return to the pre-June 1989 investment boom. Industrialists continue to insist 
that what they do vis a vis new investment will be very much affected by government 
policy. This message is being sent loudly and clearly to the leadership by the foreign 
investment community and by Japanese and Western governments. 
Evidence from our research suggests that while there is still much that is contradictory in 
that policy - particularly as it is implemented at lower levels -the leadership is sincere about 
maintaining an open stance towards foreign investment. However, they do have a clear 
preference for the type of foreign investment they wish to welcome into the country. 
Recent decisions and policy statements make it clear that high technology investment 
projects involving the development and production of new and technologically advanced 
products, technologies or applications will continue to be given very favourable 
consideration. 
Likewise foreign investments in some capital- and technology-intensive infrastructure 
projects such as nuclear power or telecommunications - will be treated favourably though 
many of these infrastructure projects will also revert back to a development financing 
format. Moreover it was made clear to us that China is keen to counterbalance its 
overwhelming S& T and industrial dependence on Japan and the US by further developing 
links with Europe. 
Projects with foreign involvement that are deemed of national importance will now largely 
be handled by the centre rather than by provincial authorities. Local officials will ultimately 
retain a measure of decisionmaking power but will be "encouraged" to only enter into 
projects that address the key aims of the new investment policy which emphasizes 
movement into higher value-added export industries, the pursuit of essential import 
substitution and quick foreign currency generation and require minimal investment from 
central funds. 
These indications of current attitudes of the leadership toward foreign investment and the 
differential ability and interest of different foreign governments and enterprises to exploit 
current conditions raise issues of considerable strategic importance both for the Community 
and more particularly for European enterprises either already present or contemplatil')g entry 
into China. They are addressed in the final section of Part 1. 
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1.4. THE REFORM OF CHINA'S S&T SYSTEM 
Though always considered important, the development and strengthening of the S& T 
system in China began in 1979 to be accorded a central role in the country's modernization 
strategy. Technological change and hence the capacity of the country's R&D system to 
generate innovations were identified as the main mechanisms for improving economic 
performance and maintaining economic growth. Indeed, in the early 1980s, the emphasis 
given by the leadership to the critical importance of S& T in China's new growth-oriented 
development strategy was so great that at times it was taken to the point of naivete. This 
concern with enhancing the state of China's S&T capabilities was greatly intensified by the 
leadership's fast growing awareness, and fear, of the implications of the developments in 
new technologies. 
The emphasis given to S& T in the Sixth Five-Year Plan demonstrated this high-level 
commitment. 16.8 per cent of state expenditures were allocated to science, technology 
and education - appreciably more than the 11 per cent allocated during the previous plan. 
Thirty-eight fields of technology and 114 key R&D programmes were singled out for special 
attention and investment. 9 A special fund of 130 billion yuan was allocated for the 
technical transformation of China's 400,000 enterprises 
Even more significant, the leadership recognized that even with greater resource allocation, 
China's highly centralized and rigidly controlled S& T system simply could not cope with the 
new demands being placed upon it. Fundamental institutional and organizational change 
was required. The leadership convened a powerful ad hoc group of the most senior 
officials, chaired by Zhao Ziyang, who were given the task of planning the reform and 
modernization of the S&T system. 
This group, known as the Leading Group in Science and Technology, developed and 
launched in 1 985 a programme of far-reaching S& T reform on a nationwide basis that in 
many respects was more revolutionary than that attempted in the economic sphere. 10 
Certainly it was pushed through with a speed and boldness that was simply not achieved 
elsewhere in the economy - and in the process created new institutions and new nodal 
points of dynamic S& T capabilities that greatly enhanced the attractiveness of China as a 
potential partner in mutually beneficial S& T collaboration with the EC and Member States. 
1.4.1. SPECIFICS OF THE MARKET-DRIVEN REFORM OF THE S& T 
SYSTEM 
The basic objective of the reform programme was to link the performance and output of 
the R&D system much more tightly to the needs of the production sector. This was by far 
9
• These programmes were encompassed within the Sixth Five Year Plan for Key R&D projects and involved 
1450 specific projects involving some 5000 institutions and more than 100,000 S& T personnel. 
10
• The Leading Group was disbanded in 1988 after its mission of designing and launching the S& T reform 
programme was deemed completed. Prime responsibility for S&T management was passed back to SSTC who 
worked closely with the SEC (State Economic Commission) and the SPC (State Planning Commission) to undertake 
further planning and to implement reforms. See Part 2 for a full discussion. 
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the greatest weakness of the old system and manifested in a variety of ways. 11 It was 
felt the best way to achieve this was to give the market a greater role in determining what 
kind of R&D should be carried out by the research institutes while at the same time 
reducing the level of state subsidy for operating expenses of R&D institutes. The creation 
of a system of paid contracts (between R&D units and user enterprises) along with 
fundamental changes in way central financial resources for R&D were allocated were the 
two keys to the reform of the S& T system. 
Under the paid contract system, enterprises negotiate a contract with an R&D unit to carry 
out specific R&D work (or the provision of technical consultancy services) at an agreed 
price or else they could sell technology that they had already developed. In this way the 
institute could increase its outside earnings and become less dependent on the state while 
also orienting its research efforts to producing innovations actually needed by the economy. 
Such an approach may seem straightforward enough to western observers but in the 
Chinese context it was truly revolutionary. 
Co-incident with these moves, the government also set up a mechanism to chann~l the 
funding and direction of basic research through one centralized body as well instituting a 
new system of funding for applied R&D whereby R&D institutions would compete for 
central government resources and the awarding of major R&D projects on the basis of 
competitive tenders and bids. 
In parallel with these central reforms in the linking of R&D to production and the state 
funding of R&D, a large number of institutional innovations and other changes to 
established practice were introduced. Among the most significant were: 
the establishment of technology "markets" that encouraged R&D institutions to market 
their wares to user agencies and enterprises in order to stimulate production-oriented 
R&D and increase the rate and spread of diffusion of innovation; 
the strengthening of enterprise capabilities to articulate demands for innovations 
supplied by the S& T system and enhancing their abilities to absorb new technology. This 
strategy is linked to the economic reforms of state productive enterprises and to policies 
promoting the technological transformation of existing industries; 
the reorganizing of the training and career development procedures of scientific and 
technical personnel working in the state-supported S& T system thereby allowing the 
movement of personnel between institutions and tying promotion to merit and 
performance; 
the organizational and financial reform of the Chinese Academy of Sciences (and its 
associated institutes) and the research activities of the higher education system in order 
to give them greater autonomy, encourage them to forge links with the production 
sector and the local community and generate greater initiative on the part of research 
personnel; 
the creation of a wide variety of new research and scientific production institutions and 
organizations set up both to meet the specific R&D needs of specific sectors as well as 
to integrate scientific research and production. These institutions which take a variety 
of forms survive financially by meeting market demands for their work and are thus able 
to operate more or less independently from centralized control. 
11
• See the discussion 1n Tony Sa1ch, China's Sc1ence Policy in the 1 980s, Manchester Umvers1ty Press, 1989. 
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1.5. SYSTEMIC PROBLEMS EMERGE AMIDST RESOUNDING SUCCESS 
Virtually every one of the substantive S& T reforms undertaken in the 1 985-1989 period 
constituted a major and fundamental change on established practice. Consequently, they 
were inevitably bound to come up against a diverse array of difficulties and obstacles. This 
is particularly the case if one takes into account the size and complexity of the Chinese 
S& T system. 12 
Some were internal to the S& T system and centered on the reluctance of certain 
institutions and administrative personnel to relinquish their privileged positions. Other more 
serious problems arose because the slowness of the wider price and economic reforms, 
meant that many productive enterprises still did not find it in their interest to seek out 
technological advantages from the S& T system. 
These sorts of demand determined difficulties were such that by mid-1988, there was 
widespread consensus that though the S& T reform programme had been successful, further 
real progress was dependent upon the rejuvenation of the process of economic reform. 
Needless to say matters have been considerably more complicated by the events of the 
June 1989 and the visible role in the pro-democracy movement played by leading members 
of the S& T elite. It remains to be seen how the current retrenchment will affect the future 
role accorded to the S&T system. Certainly, most of the evidence provided to us suggests 
that the government is still fully committed to the S& T reform process. 
What we want to draw attention to here is the fact that despite the problems mentioned 
above, the rate and extent of the changes in the structure and performance of the S& T 
system that actually did occur in the 1985-1989 period is remarkable. For example, a new 
venture capital initiative 13 was launched to support start-up S& T enterprises and the SSTC 
embarked on a major programme of developing a variety of high technology zones, science 
parks and technology "incubator" units. Below we review only two aspects of these 
developments in detail - the growth of technology markets and the development of civilian 
S& T enterprises while the development of high technology zones is discussed in the next 
section. 
12
• In 1987, the number of all R&D institutions affiliated with government departments at different levels stood 
at around 9000, of which 5568 were above the county level and administered centrally. By the end of 1988, 
China had a manpower stock of 9.66 million people in these categories, up from 7.35 million in 1984. Of these 
800.000 are scientists and engineers directly engaged in scientific research and technology development. By the 
end of 1 987. there were 1063 full-time institutions of higher education and there were 1 .959 million students 
enroled in this sector of which 106,185 were graduate and post·graduate students. See analysis in Part 2. 
13
• The China Venture Investment Corporation was launched in September 1985 to provide support for new 
technology development and production in existing and new enterprises. Through 1988, it had supported a total 
of 255 projects on a total investment of 730 million yuan. Few of these investments have actually been true 
venture style investments and most involved heavy purchases of equipment. More important is that prior to June 
1989, the experience of CVIC had prompted the emergence of 2 or 3 other fledgling venture enterprises- though 
the future status of these experiments in venture financing at the current time is not clear. 
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1.5.1. THE EXPLOSIVE GROWTH OF TECHNOLOGY MARKETS 
The development and growth of technology markets is a good proxy for evaluating the 
response of R&D units and enterprises to the paid contract system. In late 1984, the State 
Council gave approval to concept of treating technology as a commodity, thus allowing 
state R&D units and others to market their technology to industrial users. 
Although informal exchanges had occurred before this approval, afterwards the scale of 
exchange increased rapidly so that by 1 986 there were 11 00 technology exchange centres 
and 3000 technical service and consulting organizations at prefectural and city level 
nationwide compared to just 146 exchange centres a year earlier. Beginning from a value 
of technology transactions of only 50 million yuan in 1983, ($1 0 million) the first year of 
the technology market experiment, total technology market transactions leapt to 720 
million yuan in 1984, 3.20 billion yuan in 1985 and over 4.5 billion yuan (nearly $1 billion) 
- based on over 150,000 separate transactions in 1988 and equivalent to more than 40 per 
cent of China's total R&D expenditures in that year. 14 -
Three other aspects of the Chinese technology markets are worth noting. First, the concept 
has been introduced in a highly flexible manner. Relationships between R&D units and 
enterprises have included joint development efforts, long-term co-operation, joint bidding, 
multiple players - including foreign firms - as well as a variety of payment formats such as 
royalties, flat fees, etc. 
Second, numerous institutional innovations were developed in order to provide the 
structures to allow the markets to operate. These ranged from the passage of patent and 
technology contract legislation (which also had significant positive implications for the 
international flow of technology to China) to the setting up by 1988 of nearly 10,000 
service groups and agencies dedicated to facilitating technology transactions. Third, there 
is every reason to believe that the authorities will continue to allow these technqology 
markets and related service organizations to continue to operate once conditions settle 
down. 
1.5.2. THE RISE OF SCIENTIFIC ENTERPRISES AND MINBAN SCIENCE 
FIRMS 
Another set of related developments that occurred in the wake of the S& T reforms relates 
to the emergence of a large number of new technology-intensive research and production 
enterprises operating both within the state sector and outside of it. Again, the initial 
reforms stimulated the emergence of these enterprises in 1 984/85 and the State Council 
formally encouraging their further development in 1 987. These new civilian S& T 
enterprises encompass a variety of actors and operational formats engaging in a range of 
technology- intensive commercial activities. 16 
,. For further details see R.Conroy, "Reforms to the Science and Technology System at Provincial and 
Municipal Level, • Mimeo, OECD, Paris, 1989. 
15
• The actors mvolved include individuals, collectives, state-run R&D institutes, universities, and state 
agencies like the CAS and the operational format introduced include individual ownership, share companies, 
conglomerates, and JOint ventures. Their actiVIties range from integrated units carrying out R&D, production and 
trade in high and med1um technology areas, R&D agencies carrying out contract research, university-based groups 
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The Chinese Academy of Science (CAS) played a leading role in launching some of the 
more notable scientific enterprises when from 1 987 onwards it began to facilitate the 
creation of enterprises run and staffed by some of the best of its personnel. By 1989 some 
400 such companies had been launched with revenues of $241 million and employing well 
over 10,000 individuals. 
More than 1 5 of these companies are run by the central staff of the Academy and are 
operating in key areas of strategic importance; some are run by CAS affiliated institutes 
and, most significantly from our perspective, others are joint ventures formed in 
co-operation with foreign firms and oriented toward exports of technology-intensive 
products. 16 CAS has also been setting up services agencies to support this growing 
network of high tech ventures. It has linked up with U.S. and Hong Kong investors to 
create a finance company; it has established a consulting agency which acts as a 
matchmaker to assist CAS companies in linking with foreign or domestic partners; and it 
has formed a corporation to promote the export of CAS technology. These latter two 
agencies respond to specific requests for assistance from CAS companies and also 
facilitate the efforts of foreign firms who approach CAS (or SSTC or MOFERT) to identify 
potential Chinese partners. Annex 1 gives further details of the major-affiliated companies 
of the CAS - all of whom either have or are seeking further international collaboration. 
Other similar companies have been spun off from universities, from research institutes 
under industrial ministries and even from S& T associations. 17 All feature some form of 
concrete link to state institutions, as well as a high tech production and product base, and 
an emphasis on R&D and innovation. 
In parallel with the emergence of these state-linked S& T firms, many scientists decided to 
separate completely from the state system in order to set up a wide variety of new 
technology-intensive companies. These minban (non-governmental) science firms, 
numbered between 10,000 and 15,000 in 1988 and employed more than 400,000 staff. 
Although they represent only a small fraction of total output, some reached prominent 
positions in certain segments requiring high technology applications and marketing flexibility 
such as electronics and new materials - though most are not R&D intensive. 
Many minban have struggled to overcome financial and political constraints to survive and 
now exist only on paper. However others were much more successful and a few such as 
the Stone Corporation known as China's IBM (with sales in 1988 of nearly 900 million yuan 
carrying out teaching, research and production on a contract basis and various kinds of consulting enterprises. 
16
• Hong Kong firms have been the most active (one has joined with the Institute of Zoology to produce 
pesticides) but others are getting into the act. A Japanese company is involved in a joint venture with CAS to 
produce infra-red filters, a U.S. firm is co-operating with another CAS enterprise, Kejian, to produce phased array 
sector medical scanning products involving joint research in Massachucetts and production in the Shekou Special 
Economic Zone. The quality and cost combination of the product is superior to anything on the market and 
Japanese have been forced to cut prices to compete; the same CAS company is involved in the production of 
nuclear magnetic resonators -the U.S firm supplies the electronics, Kejian provides the magnetics, while software 
and systems engineering is done jointly. 
11
• By 1988, 283 institutions of higher learning had set up 571 S&T complexes encompassing over 1200 
enterprises featuring links between production and research. Local S& T associations linked to CAST (the Chinese 
Association for Science and Technology) have also, since the mid-1980s, been organizing individuals and groups 
to provide consultancy services to small and medium enterprises. By 1987, local S& T associations had been 
involved in 53,000 consultancy proJects involving 516,000 association members. 
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($70 million) based on imported and home design computers and printers became quite 
influential in policy circles prior to Tiananmen Square. 
In the Chinese context, these ambitious, scientist-led entrepreneurial initiatives constituted 
a truly dramatic break from past institutional practice and in terms of the social role of 
individual scientists. While it was never likely that the whole of the state S& T system 
would go down this route, minban science firms and scientific enterprises do offer an 
alternative vision of what can be achieved within the system that is heartening and 
encouraging both to the science community and to the progressive wing of the leadership. 
From our perspective, these enterprises could occupy a key position as a focal point for 
innovative collaborative projects with the Commission. The evidence available to us 
suggests that while the survival of these enterprises in their pre-June 1989 form may be 
in doubt (particularly the minban firms), there will still be room for them to operate once 
the situation becomes more stable. Certainly, evidence generated by our interviews with 
senior SSTC officials indicated that the further development and creation of these forms 
would continue to be encouraged. The options open to the Community regarding possible 
collaboration with these enterprises are explored in Section 7. 
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1.6. CHINA'S CENTER-PROPELLED DRIVE TO ESTABLISH NATIONAL 
HIGH TECHNOLOGY RESEARCH AND PRODUCTION CAPABILITIES 
Since the mid 1 980s and in the midst of the S& T reforms discussed above, the Chinese 
leadership has pursued a vigorous and high profile campaign to develop and strengthen 
China's high technology capabilities via R&D, the launching of new institutional innovations, 
and the acquisition of knowledge through international collaboration. These programmes 
have involved a significant expenditure of resources and the drafting in of the leading 
scientific minds in China on targeted R&D projects. Through these efforts, the government 
has signalled clearly the importance it attaches to the development of China's high 
technology capabilities. 
This policy thrust is clearly central to our concerns. The activities undertaken have begun 
to create the right starting conditions for rapid high tech development in China. If these 
R&D efforts are pursued in the 1990s with the same vigour that they were launcheo prior 
to June 1989, they could translate into a broad range of opportunities for- R&D 
collaboration with China. Chinese officials interviewed felt that in the short to medium 
term, the human and institutional capabilities being created in the course of these high tech 
programmes could serve as an ideal base for EC collaborative initiatives. 
It is, however, quite difficult to disentangle precisely what is happening in the high tech 
area both because there have been many new initiatives and because there is a deal of 
overlap in the plans that describe the new programmes and in the institutional set-up for 
directing and implementing these activities. What we have tried to do for this strategic 
report is highlight three of these programmes and areas involving state-supported 
technology development activity in high technology sectors where the prospects for 
mutually beneficial collaboration between the Community and China seem greatest. 18 In 
Part 2, we give more detail on the actual institutional set up with regards to the formulation 
and administration of Chinese S& T policy as well as highlighting specifically Chinese policy 
towards high tech industries and their technological capabilities. 
1.6.1. THE NATIONAL HIGH TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT PLAN FOR 
RESEARCH, TRAINING AND PRODUCTION 
In March 1986, China launched what it considers its prime response to the technological 
revolution that was transforming the entire basis of production and competition among the 
advanced industrial economies. Known by a variety of names such as the Baliusan or 863 
Programme, it grew out of the efforts of 1 00 leading scientists and the SSTC to map out 
high technology development in China until the year 2000. 
The plan was described to us as being modelled after Europe's Eureka programme (though 
the similarities are hard to discern). It incorporates a medium and long term R&D strategy 
18
• We have not cons1dered a number of other important state sponsored technology development programmes 
such as the SPARK programme because we felt they were somewhat outside the terms of reference for this 
project. In this context we should mention that some of the officials interviewed felt that the SPARK programme 
in particular could be an appropriate area for European/Chinese S& T collaboration. See Conroy op. cit. for an 
analysis. 
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to close the knowledge and capability gap between China and the advanced industrial 
countries in 7 priority high technology sectors deemed critical to China's future 
development - biotechnology, space technology, IT, laser technology, automation 
technology, energy technology and new materials. 
The State Science and Technology Commission (effectively the ministry for science and 
technology in China) or SSTC is responsible for the 863 programme which features highly 
focussed R&D and training projects designed to lay the groundwork for an advanced 
production capability in the post-2000 era. 19 The selectivity element is critical to allow 
the necessary scale of investment (in term of manpower creation and finance) required to 
achieve catch-up. The main funding targets of the R&D programme have been the absolute 
top-rung of China's scientists who were, in some cases, invited to submit bids and tenders 
that were assessed by committees of experts. 
The aim was to involve co-operative groups of researchers in different institutions using 
existing laboratories and equipment to pursue advanced applied research in key topic areas. 
Ultimately, the intention is to bring the products developed into commercial production 
thought the focus on the present term is achieving breakthroughs on applications 
bottle-necks in the laboratory. 
The budget for the 863 programme is not available officially but some estimates given to 
us were that on the order of 5 billion yuan has already been committed to projected 
activities through 1995. By the end of 1989, 10,000 scientists were already at work on 
more than one hundred 863 projects being carried out at over 200 R&D institutes. 
Preparations are already underway to launch the next phase of the 863 programme in the 
mid 1990s that will involve taking the products developed into the production stage for 
domestic as well as export. Plans are also now being laid to bring in international 
collaboration at the institutional and corporate level on certain 863 priority areas. This is 
an area where further discussion between the Community and the SSTC should generate 
some concrete possibilities for collaboration. More details of the priority projects selected 
for the 863 programme are given in Annex 2. 
1.6.2. THE TORCH PROGRAMME FOR THE STIMULATION OF HIGH 
TECHNOLOGY INDUSTRIES 
The greatest weakness of China's S& T system has historically been its inability to 
effectively transfer research to production. The recently launched "TORCH" programme in 
1988 is designed explicitly to exploit China's current capabilities in advanced technology 
by accelerating their commercialisation both domestically and in export markets. In 
addition, it also aims to stimulate the development of new high technology enterprises so 
as to achieve, primarily through exports, a dramatic increase in their share of industrial 
structure and GNP by the end of the century. The programme is intended to rely on funds 
from central government as well as on bank loans and foreign borrowing. A wide range 
of financial instruments designed to encourage establishment of TORCH Programme 
enterprises are being developed and implemented. 
19
• The Seventh Five Year Plan for S&T Development parallels the 863 plan in terms of its emphasis on high 
tech development but instead has a short term focus on the rapid development and deployment of specific 
advanced technologies. This plan IS discussed further m Part 2. 
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The short-medium term targets of the programme are impressive. These include fostering 
the creation of 1000-2000 new high tech enterprises both independent and attached to 
R&D institutes and employing 1 00,000 S& T trained personnel; the development of 2000 
new products, 30 percent aimed for the international market; creation of high tech 
incubators and development zones; the training of 20,000 managers and overseas trade 
specialists; and expanding the base of specialized venture capital institutions. 
Our evidence suggests that in some categories, significant progress has been made in 
achieving these targets. For example Wuhan, Shenzen, Guangzhou and Shanghai have 
established Science Parks housing R&D intensive enterprises linked to (and often sponsored 
by) university departments. 20 The central government has likewise already approved the 
establishment of 22 technology "incubator" units based on the U.S. AID model and 24 high 
technology development experimental zones in more than 12 cities. 
The most interesting and far advanced of these is the Zhongguancun area in Beijing which 
though in existence before TORCH serves a model for TORCH type enterprise zones. 
It is already home to more than 700 new technology enterprises spread across electronics, 
biotechnology, space technology, new materials and optoelectronics. It also incorporates 
China's silicon valley, an agglomeration of more than 150 minban electronics firms 
employing more than 4000 people. Between 1984 and 1987, the number of people 
employed in Zhongguancun is 16,000 of which scientists and technicians account for 50 
percent. 70 per cent of the firms are scientific enterprises and about 30 firms are joint 
ventures with foreign enterprises producing for export. 
In terms of projects launched under the TORCH programme, the numbers appear equally 
impressive. Up till May 1990, some 1500 applications for central TORCH funds have been 
submitted out of which 272 have been selected - on the criteria that they are 
technologically advanced, suitable for mass production, have good market prospects and 
can be brought to the market inside of three years. Another 500 applications are now 
undergoing evaluation. 
The problem with qualitative performance data such as that presented above for the 863 
and the TORCH programme is that it is often difficult to get a real feel for what substance 
there is behind the numbers. Nevertheless, it was clear from our interviews not only that 
progress has been made in the TORCH programme but that the leadership apparently 
remains committed to the initiative. Moreover, it was stressed to us that the pursuit of the 
TORCH programme and the continued strengthening of China's high technology industrial 
capabilities would rely heavily on international R&D collaboration and the development of 
outward-oriented enterprises and joint ventures with foreign firms. 
Annex 3 contains details of some of the key areas where the SSTC is keen to see 
international collaboration under the TORCH Programme and where the EC might consider 
focussing its future S& T collaborative efforts. Given that by the end of 1990, the 
production value of China's high tech industries is expected to top $1 0 billion, the further 
planned acceleration of the development of this sector via the TORCH programme (with the 
maximization of exports and foreign collaboration being given a top priority) is worthy of 
careful consideration from the point of view of collaborative possibilities. 
20
• The Wuhan East Lake New Technology Innovation and Service Centre, established only in 1989 has already 
helped set up 22 small enterpnses based on new and hrgh technology. 
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1.6.3. STRENGTHENING LONG TERM BASIC RESEARCH CAPABILITIES 
China's leadership also has long had its eyes firmly placed on the long term challenges of 
Chinese development. It has therefore, pursued since 1 985 (with less fanfare but 
ultimately more investment than both 863 and TORCH) a policy of developing and 
strengthening Chinese basic research capabilities at the international frontiers of science. 
There are many facets to this policy worthy of note but two are particularly relevant to our 
concerns. 
The first involves the establishment of the National Natural Science Foundation (NSFCl in 
1 986. The purpose of this move was to create an institution responsible for the planning, 
development and funding of all central government supported basic research activities. As 
in the new approach to the funding for applied research, the NSFC awards its funds on the 
basis of competition and peer group and expert committee evaluation. While not all of the 
NSFC funds are concentrated in high and key technology areas, there is a clear emphasis 
towards this direction with the share rising from 20 percent in 1 988 to 35 percent by 
1992. 
The significance of the emergence of the NSFC to our concerns is two fold. First, there 
was a consensus among those interviewed inside and outside of China that the creation 
of the NSFC, its central control over all basic research activities and the highly competent 
way in which it is carrying out its duties have strengthened greatly Chinese basic research 
capabilities in a large number of high technology areas. It is unquestionably the major actor 
at the national level in basic research with an annual budget of $750 million supporting 
projects in 1 1 00 institutions. 
Second, given this success there were indications that the role of the NSFC was going to 
be strengthened further overall in the future and it is already viewed by those interviewed 
as the focal institution responsible for negotiating and arranging international collaboration 
in basic science. Further details are provided in Part Ill. 
1.6.4. THE NATIONAL KEY LAB PROGRAMME 
Since 1986, China has embarked upon a programme of strengthening its basic research 
capabilities. Major changes are taking place with respect to the organization, creation, 
funding, staffing and tasking of the country's network of basic research laboratories. There 
are a variety of efforts under way in this area jointly and individually under the responsibility 
of the SSTC, the State Education Commission, the Chinese Academy of Sciences and the 
Ministries of Public Health and Agriculture. 
One area where major changes have been put in train relates to establishing a basic 
research capability in universities - something that never existed before because of the 
policy of divorcing research from education, as is discussed in Part Ill. Here the CAS and 
the State Education Commission are directly involved. Since 1 985 forty new research labs 
and institutes have been opened at universities. Moreover, the State Education 
Commission has itself established·22 labs, of which 7 have been specially equipped for the 
visits of foreign scholars. And together the CAS and the universities have established a 
Page 20 - Sast Project 1 Report on China 
Strategic Review 
number of prestigious joint open labs focussing on high technology and meant as sites for 
international collaboration. 21 
Another major programme of more direct relevance to our concerns involves the creation 
and funding a network of what are called National Key Research Labs. The aim behind this 
programme is build centres of excellence in experimental research that will allow Chinese 
scientists to work with world class facilities on frontier science problems of direct relevance 
to China's needs. 
Of significance to our interest, national key labs have been designated as focal points for 
international R&D collaboration. So far since 1985, 30 entirely new labs have been 
constructed and opened under this programme and another 38 are presently in the final 
stages of completion. The full plan calls for the establishment of some 400 national key 
lab centres of excellence by the year 2000. Initial funding of $220 million in 1984 
(including $120 million from the World Bank) has been augmented by an annual budget of 
$150 million. 
Key lab status is awarded through competition open to existing institutions and new 
research groupings. In keeping with changes elsewhere in the R&D system, the 
competition is based on academic merit as is the election of the Director of the labs and 
the selection of staff. This may sound perfectly normal to outside observers but it is a 
revolution in the way basic research institutes are staffed and funded in China. 
The key labs are mainly organized in relation to problem areas or topics rather than 
discipline as in the past. Their precise research topics are determined through a 
combination of self - selection by the Institute and its staff and through competing for 
central research allocated by the SSTC under the guide-lines of the National Key R&D 
Plans. A list of National Key Labs provided specially for us by the Chinese authorities is 
given in Annex 4. 
21
• For example, three of these have been set up jomtly by the Academy, Beijing Unaversity and Qinghua 
University in biological membrane engmeenng, artlficaal micro-structure physics, and structural chemistry. 
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1.7. PROPOSALS FOR EXPANDED S&T COLLABORATION WITH CHINA 
China places enormous importance on partiCipating in international S& T exchange and 
co-operation agreements on a bilateral and multilateral basis. These links represent a vital 
source of experience and knowledge as well as technical and financial assistance and have 
made a valuable contribution to development in the country. 22 Since June 1989, the 
government has worked hard to restore the damage done to China's international standing 
by the tragic events in Tiananmen Square by seeking to re-establish, maintain and expand 
its international S& T activities and agreements. 
The EC (in common with some other countries and agencies) is now moving towards (and 
may have already formally agreed) to resume its S& T collaboration activities with China 
after suspending these in the wake of the events of June 4 and afterwards. This would 
entail the resumption of what was already an extensive programme of technical assistance 
and collaborative activities in the S& T field. 23 
Not surprisingly however, the government officials we spoke with (primarily from the SSTC 
and affiliated agencies). expressed considerable interest and enthusiasm during our 
interviews for an even greater level of involvement with the EC in S& T collaboration than 
had existed in the past. While they were not in a position to make overly specific proposals 
for collaboration they made clear that China would be favourably disposed towards carrying 
the discussions further. 24 
One of the critical questions the EC now faces is whether it should move beyond the 
resUinption of normal relations and begin to explore the possibility of a greater degree of 
S&T collaborative activity with China. This is a political judgement best left to the 
Commission. However, based on our research and interviews, we can put forward a 
number of observations and proposals that relate to this question and to the other issues 
of central concern to the SAST project. 
We would like to start with a few general observations linked to the points made above 
about China's strong desire to foster greater international S& T ties before moving on to 
more specific proposals. We should make clear that our entry point into this discussion is 
that further collaboration could certainly be justified on the basis of the mutual benefit that 
would arise in the short and the medium term. 
22
• There is a more extensive discussion of Chinese strategoes towards international S& T collaboration in Part 
2. See also Bobiane Han-Etty, "Chma's Science Policy, International Co-operation and its Prospects", China 
Information, Volume Ill, Summer 1988 for a fairly comprehensive listing of existing international agreements. In 
addition, Wu Yikang, Director-General of the Department of International Co-operation, SSTC prepared a document 
for this project entitled "China's Policy and Expenence m lnternatoonal Scientific and Technical Co-Operation" that 
could be made available if desired. 
23
• See the document, "La Co-operatoon Entre La Communaute Europeenne et Ia Republique Populaire de Chine: 
Note de Background, Brussels 28th February 1989 for further details. 
24
• We should make clear here that SRA had the opportunity of discussing our preliminary conclusions with 
senior Chinese S& T officials 1n Beijing in February 1991. Overall, these were well received and the advisability 
and possibility of expanded S& T collaboratoon woth the Community and the Commission was universally endorsed. 
During this occasion, we also pressed for specofic recommendations and observations on the types of S&T 
collaboration proposed by SRA in ots forst draft. Some recommendations were made by these officials (and these 
have been incorporated 1n the thos fmal report) but by and large they felt that the best way forward was for more 
detailed discussions to be undertaken by the Commossoon and Chona at an offocial level. 
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1.7.1. CONSIDERABLY INCREASED BARGAINING POWER FOR EUROPE 
AND THE COMMISSION 
During the 1980s, China had become a favoured recipient of international S& T assistance 
from multilateral and bilateral agencies, often coming top or near the top of the list in terms 
of the allocation of resources. 26 The size of the country, the extent of its needs, the 
enormous potential of its domestic market and most importantly its rapidly growing political 
and economic significance on the world stage acted as powerful magnet in attracting this 
attention. In the course of developing these linkages, China accrued a formidable 
reputation as a tough and expert negotiator very adept at exploiting the enthusiasm of 
competing agencies in order to garner the best possible deal. It had much the same 
reputation in the realm of industrial negotiations with foreign firms over the terms of 
eQuipment purchases, technology transfer contracts and investment arrangements. 
-
The events of June 1989 and their aftermath has significantly weakened the bargaining 
power of China in the international arena. We have already pointed out some of the 
concessions it has been forced to make in its intellectual property and foreign investment 
regime in order to attract new investment. This tact, and the continued importance being 
laid by the leadership on maintaining forward progress in the area of S& T development, 
have created favourable conditions for expanding S& T collaboration with China. 
Another trend running in Europe's favour is growing Chinese disenchantment with the 
aggressive nature of Japan's efforts to dominate trade with China while being reluctant to 
effectively transfer technology. We were advised that this problem is receiving particular 
attention among senior policymakers and that considerable trade advantages could develop 
for European firms willing to transfer technology to China. It was acknowledged in our 
interviews that the Community could advance this process considerably. 
Taking advantage of the favourable co-incidence of these different trends to strengthen 
Europe's S& T and industrial links with China will reQuire a clear set of objectives and 
detailed knowledge of the economic and political pressures operating on China at the 
moment, the institutional set-up as well as Chinese S& T and industrial priorities and related 
strengths and weaknesses. This report goes some way toward providing this detail -
though inevitably more information may be reQuired to support detailed strategy design and 
subseQuent negotiations. 
1.7.2. THERE ARE LEGITIMATE GROUNDS FOR PRESSING CHINA TO 
GO FORWARD WITH REFORMS RELATED TO S&T 
While the Chinese authorities have proved very resistant to what they perceive as 
unwarranted interference in internal affairs, they are most likely to listen it such pressure 
is applied to reform areas where they need expanded international contact. Investment by 
international firms and international flows of S& T are two such areas. Thus the EC can 
play a positive role by emphasizing, in the appropriate context, the value to China of a more 
25
• It was for instance the foremost recipient of UNDP funds (totalling $256.5 million between 1979-1991) 
as well as being the largest recipient of U.S. S&T assistance. 
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general spirit of openness and the need to maintain its forward movement on reform 
activities related to foreign enterprises and the S& T system. The message needs to be 
gotten through that ultimately greater openness will probably be of much greater benefit 
to the China. 
1.7.3. THE CHINESE DESIRE TO PURSUE PARTICIPATION IN THE 
EUROPEAN FRAMEWORK PROGRAMME 
An issue that came up repeatedly in our interviews was a strong desire on the part of the 
Chinese S& T establishment that China be allowed to participate in the Framework 
programme. We indicated that this was not permitted under the current terms of the 
Framework programme nor was it likely that there would be any changes in this position. 
However, the issue came up so often in our interviews that we feel obliged to flag this as 
an issue which the Chinese will undoubtedly continue to pursue in any future official 
discussions with the Commission. 
I. 7 .4. CONFUSION OVER THE MEANING OF MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL 
S&T COLLABORATION 
Some of the officials we interviewed had difficulty understanding the Commission's interest 
in developing collaborative S& T projects where the mutual benefits to both sides were 
concrete and demonstrable. Their difficulties with this position arose partly because they 
insisted on looking at S& T collaboration with the Community from the aid-related 
perspective on which EC funded S& T projects had been undertaken in the past. They also 
were of the rather traditional opinion that all international S& T exchange was mutually 
beneficial in principle and did not have to be proven in specific terms. The gulf in perception 
of the meaning of mutual benefit was much greater in the case of China than with any 
other of the countries studied for the SAST project. 
This difference in perception might conceivably be a stumbling block in further discussions 
regarding collaboration along SAST lines if it is not addressed head on. However, it should 
be possible to clear up any misperceptions by careful discussion of the Commission's 
precise meaning of mutual benefit in this case. It is essential that this discussion takes 
place. The EC should be aware that great problems have arisen in the realm of international 
S& T exchange between China and the advanced countries in the past as a result of 
differing perceptions on issues that seemed straightforward at the outset. 26 
26
• These problems have cropped up m many sectors. See for example the case of the off-shore oil sector 
discussed in G .Oldham et al, "Technology Transfer to the Chmese Offshore Oil Industry," SPRU Occasional Paper 
No. 27 ., Umversity of Sussex, 1988. 
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/NDUSTRY-RELA TED /NIT/A TIVES 
1.7.5. OPPORTUNITIES FOR FOREIGN ENTERPRISES 
As noted above, despite some problems, the general thrust of the "open door" policy will 
remain in the open direction established earlier. Indeed, it is clear the government is 
increasingly anxious to attract more foreign investment and production activities by offering 
better terms and conditions than at any time during the 1980s. More specifically, there 
was acknowledgement in our interviews that Chinese reliance on Japan and the US as their 
main sources of industrial technology had to be moderated. Japanese reluctance to transfer 
technology was a particular source of irritation and it was pointed out that there were 
considerable trade advantages for European firms who were prepared to effectively transfer 
technology. 
We believe this situation presents genuine opportunities that could be exploited by foreign 
enterprises who understand how to do business with the Chinese. The prospects, as noted 
earlier are particularly bright for firms operating in high technology sectors, for those able 
to put together technology-intensive projects in mainstream manufacturing sectors and for 
those able to guarantee that a majority of output will be exported. 27 
There is by now a great wealth of well documented and easily accessible experiences by 
foreign firms on the particular problems and rewards of operating in China on which these 
companies can draw in formulating their strategy. 28 There could be a specific role for the 
Community to play in promoting further investment projects by European firms. The 
officials we interviewed were not however in a position to offer much insight on what this 
role should be - other than to point out that the bilateral agencies of some European 
countries had previously been the main vehicles through which European governments had 
advanced the interests of their industrialists in China. Thus the Community will need to 
develop support programmes and initiatives that complement the efforts of bilateral 
agencies. 
27
• A number of specific recommendations were made with regard to areas for industrial collaboration with 
Europe where the Commission might be able to play a facilitating role. The aircraft industry, motor vehicles, iron 
and steel and machine tools were singled out as mature industries where further collaboration would be welcomed. 
28
• There are many references but see especially the articles in The China Business Review for practical detail 
based on direct empirical research but see also for example B.B.Schlegelmilch et al "The China Syndrome: An 
Empirical Investigation of Danish Companies' Expenences m the People's Republic of China," Department of 
Business Studies, University of Edinburgh, Working Paper No 88/21 for an academic survey; Jim Mann, Beijing 
Jeep: The Short, Unhappy Romance of American Business in China, New York:Simon and Schuster, 1989 for in 
depth journalistic reporting; and Alan M.Webber, "The Case of the China Diary", Harvard Busmess Review, 
November-December 1989 for a management perspective. 
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1.7.6. TWO POSSIBILITIES FOR PURSUING INNOVATIVE FORMS OF 
COLLABORATION 
There are two areas of possible collaboration where it may prove fruitful to have 
exploratory discussions with SSTC as well as with other elements of the government 
apparatus such as MOFERT, the agency concerned with foreign investment and trade or 
the Chinese Venture Investment Corporation (CVIC). The first relates to possible EC 
support for the fledgling but still operating venture capital agencies in China who are now 
being promoted by the TORCH programme. Such support could be tied to the participation 
of European firms or laboratories with Chinese firms in joint projects to develop new 
products or processes for domestic production and export. However, this is probably best 
considered as a medium term initiative since a number of obstacles still exist to the creation 
of a genuine venture capital market in China - such as tremendous distortions in the pricing 
system, the lack of a bankruptcy law and the very primitive nature of existing stock 
markets. 
The second follows on from the earlier discussion of the emergence and development of 
scientific enterprises and minban firms in the civilian S& T sector. The S& T reform process 
in China, with its emphasis on the market and rewarding individual merit, freed a significant 
portion of the Chinese science community from the institutional and personal shackles 
under which they had been constrained since 1949. In this new environment, Chinese 
scientists and technicians demonstrated a willingness to experiment with organizational 
change and take quite exceptional entrepreneurial and career risks while at the same time 
producing good science that was often of international significance. Certainly, the 
activities of these scientists created many nodal points where the EC could develop 
innovative and beneficial collaborative projects. 
While there is some evidence that minban firms are temporarily out of favour among more 
conservative middle ranking bureaucrats, we found a general endorsement among the 
officials we consulted for expanding European contacts with these firms. It is also clear 
that the government also attachs considerable importance to strengthening other aspects 
of the civilian S& T sector - including encouraging their linking up with foreign enterprises. 
In light of this, the EC could propose a programme of joint research and/or production 
ventures between scientific enterprises and European firms. This should be targeted both 
at the less favoured private sector minban firms and at those enterprises retaining state 
links. Such a programme would also obviously need to be well-defined by product, topic 
or problem area. 
Such links would strengthen considerably the domestic pos1t1on of minban firms. And 
depending on the project, European firms could conceivably benefit in a number of ways 
-through the lower unit R&D costs; through efficient product development work aimed at 
the local market; through access to product or process technology developed by the 
minbans themselves; and most importantly through the creation of a high tech base for the 
expansion of its operations in China. The Chinese officials consulted felt that collaboration 
with minban firms offered real possibilities for extending EC/Chir.a S& T collaboration into 
new areas. We offer this possibility as a topic for further discussion by the relevant 
Commission services. 
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I. 7. 7. THE PROVISION OF SUPPORT TO EUROPEAN HIGH TECH FIRMS 
INTERESTED IN INVESTING IN CHINA 
Given the Chinese government's desire to attract, high tech and export oriented 
investment, there are other roles the Community could play in support of these firms. 
One would be for the EC to facilitate the provision of information support to these firms in 
the way of intelligence reports on what the competition is doing and how the government 
operates, a digest of potential investment opportunities, informed discussions of the 
particular problems of doing high tech business in China, etc. Such an initiative would 
clearly need to be well designed, targeted and should complement or build on any ongoing 
Community projects in this area. 
Another more complicated and costly initiative would be to propose EC sponsorship or 
support for a high tech zone or science park solely for use by European firms involyed in 
high tech export activities. -
COLLABORATIVE PROJECTS LINKED TO BASIC RESEARCH 
1.7.8. JOINT RESEARCH WITH NATIONAL KEY LABS 
China would appear to offer a wider range of possibilities for mutually beneficial 
collaboration in basic research than other advanced developing countries. Their capabilities 
are acknowledged as being world class in fields as diverse as short term pulses, quantum 
well structures, crystal growth, superconductors and analytical methods in materials 
research. Chinese officials interviewed were eager to encourage EC sponsorship of joint 
research and would be prepared to nominate a number of areas where such collaborations 
would be welcomed and receive favourable treatment. 
The appropriate locations for such joint research would be in any of the 68 national key 
labs (30 established and 38 under construction) that have been specifically designated as 
national centres of excellence in basic research and as suitable for joint project with foreign 
scientists. As noted above, a listing of those national key labs where international 
collaboration is being actively promoted is given in Annex 4. 
APPLIED SCIENCE-RELATED /NIT/A TIVES 
1.7.9. ESTABLISHMENT OF EC SUPPORTED APPLIED RESEARCH 
INSTITUTE TO SUPPORT JOINT RESEARCH INTO 
ENVIRONMENTAL AND AGRICULTURAL PROBLEMS 
One aspect of co-operation the Chinese were keen to promote was the establishment of 
joint research centres staffed by European and Chinese researchers to undertake joint 
projects on topics of mutual interest in the environment and agriculture. Some of these 
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have already been set up under the auspices of bilateral aid programmes but we were told 
this was an area that might be of interest to the EC. Among those already established are 
U.S. and Japanese programmes on seismic research, a French programme on plate 
tectonics, Canadian support for seafood research and Swedish support for dairy research. 
As with the efforts of these other countries, the rationale for the EC further pursuing joint 
research projects of this kind derives both from the objective of mutual benefit 
(collaboration with world-class Chinese scientists would be of benefit to European 
scientists) and from more development aid oriented objectives. 
1.7.10. DEMONSTRATION PROJECTS ORIENTED TOWARDS SYSTEMIC 
SOLUTIONS OF THE SURVIVAL PROBLEMS OF CLOSED OR 
ISOLATED COMMUNITIES 
The Chinese stressed the success of an EC funded project that constructed an energy 
demonstration base on Daichen island. Various alternative energy systems have been built, 
tested and successfully demonstrated with the aim of supporting the community's 
economic development and diversification previously constrained by an energy shortage. 
Now both sides are undertaking a joint venture to explore commercialisation and production 
of these systems for sale in China and export. The officials we spoke to emphasized they 
would value similar projects tackling similar integrated problems affecting isolated 
communities. 
NEAR-MARKET COLLABORATIVE ACTIVITIES 
1.7.11. JOINT R&D PROJECTS LEADING TO COMMERCIALISATION AND 
PRODUCTION 
China's most recent successful innovation in international S& T collaboration has involved 
activities that come very close to what we call near-market or pre-competitive research. 
One of these has been with Japan with whom Chinese researchers developed a new 
technology process for extracting niobium from molten iron. This has now been patented 
and has entered an experimental phase where mass production will be undertaken on a joint 
venture basis. They have done the same with France in relation to the development of a 
catalytic cracking agent for residual oil and are negotiating similar sorts of co-operative 
projects in relation to space and satellite technology with Germany and Brazil. 
Given the pressure on China's R&D institutes to generate outside funding, and the 
undoubted technical capabilities of some of these in areas of interest to Europe, there 
would appear to be similar prospects for other near market joint research projects that 
could be sponsored by the EC. Among those fields put forward by the Chinese as offering 
opportunities for near market joint research are space related projects, telecommunications 
networks based on ISDN, optoelectronics and optical fibres in the 2 to 5 micro meter range. 
We should make one further general point here that emerged from our interviews and 
should be kept in mind. In the more industrialized countries, a typical ratio of investment 
in research:development:production is 1:10:100. We were advised that in China, this ratio 
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is closer to 1 :0.5:several hundred. This imbalance is due to the Chinese government's past 
bias towards providing relatively generous support at the expense of investing in prototype 
and development activities as well as technology transfer. This means that there are 
probably lots of research achievements sitting "on the shelf" in China that have not been 
commercialized. European/Chinese collaborative efforts which focus on exploiting this 
dimension of Chinese S& T strengths would be well received and would have a high 
potential for generating mutual benefits. 
I. 7. 12. JOINT VENTURE TRAINING INSTITUTES 
Another collaborative model the Chinese are keen for the EC to explore relates to joint 
training institutes. Again in proposing this option to us the Chinese clearly had in mind a 
number of such institutes that have already been set up involving foreign governments and 
a mixture of aid financing and private industry support. For example, there is a Sin_o-U.S. 
Scientific and Technological Management Training Centre, a Sino-Japanese Business 
Management Training Centre and a Sino-Japanese Post and Telecommuni-cation Training 
Centre. All three of these institutes have clearly been supported by the Japanese and the 
U.S. government with an eye towards future business prospects. 
Interestingly the EC also supports 8 such training centres. However these differ from the 
others in that the commercial connections are very remote since they deal primarily with 
energy related training matters. Clearly there is room for the EC to explore the possibilities 
of supporting additional training centres where the benefits to Europe might be more easily 
realizable. 
1.7.13. EXPlOITING THE OPPORTUNITIES FOR COllABORATION 
OFFERED BY THE 863 AND TORCH PROGRAMMES 
The TORCH programme, designed to speed the commercialisation of new and existing high 
technology products and innovations within China and on an export basis is still in its early 
stages. Nevertheless, the officials we interviewed made clear that they would soon be 
looking to invite in foreign participation in different TORCH supported projects. Indeed, this 
may already be occurring and the relevant Commission services may have already been 
approached. This was emphasized repeatedly as the one of the key programmes where the 
EC should look to for collaborative possibilities. 
The way be open for the Community to pre-empt such approaches (which are almost 
certainly going to be engineered by the Chinese side to attain maximum benefit at least 
cost) by proposing a major collaborative project linked into TORCH. Its conceivable that 
in the face of this approach, the Chinese authorities might be prepared to grant special 
access and privileges to participating European firms. As noted earlier, a list of TORCH 
programmes where such collaboration would be welcome is given in Annex 3. 
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11.1. THE MAIN ELEMENTS OF REFORM AND ITS ECONOMIC 
CONSEQUENCES 
Decision Base 
Under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, China embarked on a process of far-reaching 
economic and institutional reform in 1978 whose aim was the pervasive modernization of 
the Chinese economy at all levels. The leadership embarked on the reform process for two 
reasons. First, living standards in the late 1970s had hardly risen above those of the late 
1950s. In 1977 the average wage of employees in the state industrial sector was 8.4 per 
cent lower than it had been in 195 7. As a result the population was growing restive and 
increasingly reluctant to accept continual hardship and belt-tightening in exchange for a 
promised brighter future. 
Second, the leadership under Deng was forced to recognize that the early successes of the 
pursuit of Soviet-style industrial development had given way to stagnation and severe 
economic problems that were largely structurally determined. The critical nature~,ef the 
problems faced was obvious not only from severe domestic difficulties but from growing 
awareness that the gap between China's economic achievements and those of the 
developed economies had grown massively- in 1960, China's GNP was nearly the same 
as Japan's but in 1979 it was less than one-fifth. The problems of economic and industrial 
development confronting China since the departure of the Soviets had not been relieved by 
either the Great Leap Forward or by the initial post-Mao economic strategy of the 1960s 
that laid great stress on ideological and moral incentives to stimulate expansion of the 
economy. 
In short, the leadership and the Communist party faced both a crisis of political legitimacy 
in the eyes of the population and an internal collapse of confidence in the ability of previous 
strategies to produce economic development. The net outcome of this situation was that 
by 1979, the government was forced to make a public commitment to a strategy of 
"modernization" designed to improve living standards for the mass of the people in the 
short run. Bold projections were made that this bright future would come about through 
the pursuit of rapid economic growth in three phases - doubling 1 980 gross agricultural and 
industrial output by 1990; doubling these output levels again by the year 2000; and finally 
reaching per capita income levels of moderately developed economies by the middle of the 
next century. 
11.1.1. THE MAIN ELEMENTS OF REFORM 
After a protracted period of debate and experiment that is extensively documented in the 
literature, a major programme of economic and institutional reform was instituted in order 
to allow the Chinese economy to meet these ambitious growth objectives. The reforms 
involved the phased introduction of fundamental changes on previous practice in four 
interlinked areas affecting every facet of Chinese economic activity. 
Through the introduction of the "responsibility system" in the productive sectors, workers, 
managers and enterprises were given greater autonomy and offered incentives to increase 
output, improve quality and lower costs. These reforms were first introduced into the 
agricultural sector where they proved very successful and were extended, beginning in 
1984 to the urban industrial sector. 
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Second, attempts were made to reform the price and wage system in order to give the 
market a greater (though not an entirely free) role in determining the prices of commodities, 
products and wages in both the agricultural and industrial sectors. Ultimately, this proved 
the most difficult element of the reform programme to implement both because of 
structural rigidities and the entrenched opposition of political conservatives. 
The third, and most publicized component of the reform programme was the widely 
heralded "Open Door" policy which involved an unprecedented opening of the economy to 
foreign investment and international trade. This policy constituted the central element of 
the government's ambitious modernization strategy which, it was felt, could only succeed 
by bringing into the economy large inputs of foreign technology and capital. The objective 
of the Open Door policy was to re-equip China's antiquated industrial production base while 
also creating an internationally competitive industrial sector capable of generating the 
export earnings necessary to finance further development. 
Finally, the fourth area of reform, closely linked to the other three areas involved a 
fundamental restructuring of the country's science and technology system. ThiS was 
deemed necessary because in the leadership's view, the long term success of the 
modernization programme and particularly the attainment of the growth objectives was 
critically dependent upon China's ability to generate and diffuse science and technology 
that met directly the challenges of economic development. Thus the S& T system became 
closely identified as the main mechanism for improving economic performance and 
maintaining economic growth. Because of this, reform of the S& T system became a top 
priority for the leadership - and has remained so to the present. 
11.1.2. THE COASTAL DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY 
It is worth noting separately at this stage that a significant element underlying the Open 
Door policy in particular was a strategy to rapidly advance the development of China's 
southern coastal zone. Beginning with the establishment of the four special economic 
zones in 1979 (in Shenzen, Zhuhai, Shantou and Xiamen). and strengthened by moves 
taken under the Open Door policy and the S& T reform programmes, Chinese planners 
pursued throughout the 1980s in the midst of the overall reform process a coastal 
development strategy focussing on south China. This strategy was further advanced in 
1 984 by the further opening up of another fourteen coastal cities and three coastal areas 
and finally given a formal launching in the spring of 1 988 with publication of a coastal 
economic development strategy and the establishment of Hainan Province as a special 
economic zone. By that time, this coastal zone covered some 320,000 square miles, 
populated by some 200 million people producing about 1 ,000 billion yuan of output. 
The aim of this strategy was to develop within this massive coastal area an export-oriented 
economy characterized by both labour-intensive processing industries and high technology 
industries based heavily on foreign investment and imported technology. The intention was 
that the rapid expansion of the coastal zone would thus generate export earnings, act as 
a magnet for foreign investment and technology and give an impetus to the economic 
development of the inland areas through a process of take-off and inter-industry and 
inter-regional demand and supply. 
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This parallel policy (to the reform process) of usi~g the selective opening of the Chinese 
economy to maximize access to Western and Japanese technology through foreign equity 
participation in designated areas not surprisingly was the aspect of Chinese policy that 
attracted very considerable commercial attention from foreign firms and governments. 
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11.2. FAVOURABLE ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF THE REFORM PROCESS 
During the 1980s, the implementation of China's revolutionary reform programme and 
pursuit of its ambitious economic objectives garnered much international attention. Not 
surprisingly, the interest of western and Japanese governments and firms was attracted 
by the glittering commercial prospects created by the Open Door policy and the stirring of 
China's potentially enormous domestic market. However, many other observers were 
simply struck by the enormity of the task that faced the authorities in trying to 
fundamentally transform the Chinese economy into a dynamic engine of growth. The 
problems in doing so seemed to be almost insuperable at the outset. Yet looking back over 
the years since reform in 1978, it is clear that, despite the many problems encountered, 
this has been a period of momentous and remarkable change in China. The scale and 
scope of the change is most evident in the overall performance of the economy. 
11.2.1. GENERAL PERFORMANCE OF THE ECONOMY 
As shown by Table 1, during 1981-1988, real GNP achieved an annual growth rate of 9.8 
per cent (11.1 per cent if measured between 1982 and 1988) and had reached $329.75 
billion by 1988. This growth was underpinned by annual increases in real gross industrial 
and agricultural output averaging 12.8 per cent and 7.2 per cent respectively, and a 9.5 
per cent annual growth in real national income. The growth rate achieved in all four areas 
during these years exceeded that achieved over the entire 1 953-86 period. Moreover, 
during the 1 980s, absolute levels in all these categories more than doubled over that period 
easily exceeding the first stage economic targets. 
TABLE 1: Economic growth in China, 1978-1988 (1980 prices) 
1978 1980 1985 1988 1981-87 
(billion yuan) (billion yuan) (annual growth 
rate) 
GIAOV 563.3 706.6 1333.3 2371.8 11.4 
GJOV 423.6 514.3 971.7 1810.1 12.8 
GAOV 139.7 192.3 362.1 561.8 7.2 
NJ 301.1 368.8 703.1 1153.3 9.5 
GNP 833.1 1385.3 9.8 
GIAOV - Gross mdustnal & agncultural output 
GIOV - Gross industrial output value 
GAOV - Gross agricultural output value 
Nl - National income 
Source :A statistical survey of China (1988); Almanac of China's economy (1987) 
A number of aspects of this aggregate performance are worth noting. 
China remains a poor country, with GOP per head at $340 in 1988 current prices, 
although in terms of life expectancy, nutritional standards and primary education 
availability its accomplishments particularly in the last ten years place it on equal footing 
with many middle income cou(ltries. 
- Though the bulk of employment (60.1 per cent in 1988) is still in agriculture, industry 
is increasingly dominant. This is shown by the unusually large share of industry in total 
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output (59.8 per cent in 1987). The urban economy dominates here with 60 per cent 
of industrial output coming from state-run enterprises. 
- Most of the existing state-firms have experienced some change in their operating 
environment due to the reform programme. The most significant S&T related changes 
that have occurred were a) the rapid growth of a large number of medium and high 
technology consumer goods and industrial sectors (as shown by Table 2) which for 
example saw sectors such as consumer electrical products experience a 57 per cent 
expansion of volume between 1987 and 1988; and b) the emergence of technology 
markets as a source of innovations for existing firms and the growth of so-called 
scientific enterprises linked to the R&D system. 
- The reform programme also created scope for the emergence of the private firms in the 
urban economy (at least through mid-1989) with the numbers of enterprises increasing 
from virtually zero in 1978 to nearly 225,000 by 1988 employing an estimated 3.6 
million people with an average firm size of 1 6. Among this blossoming of the private 
sector, the most notable development from our perspective has been the growth of (a 
relatively small number of) entrepreneurial S& T firms along with the entry of more than 
1 million scientists and engineers into part-time private consulting activities. 
- Finally, and probably most significantly from a macroeconomic perspective, rural reform 
gave an enormous boost to the creation of private and collective rural light industrial 
enterprises engaged in industry, construction, transport, commerce and catering. Many 
of these are quite small producing consumer and industrial goods using agricultural 
inputs but a surprisingly large number are sizeable firms, well managed and able to 
compete directly with state-owned enterprises. By 1988 there were allegedly some 19 
million of these rural or township enterprises employing more than 48 million people. 
Between 1982 and 1 986 their output grew by a staggering 43 per cent annually 
(compared to 4.2 per cent for agricultural crops) so that by 1987 the value of their 
output exceeded that of agriculture itself. In 1988, their output growth was 38.4 per 
cent or three times as fast as the state sector, raising their share of national industrial 
output to 21 per cent and accounting for a remarkable $8.02 billion (16.2 per cent) of 
China's total exports (mainly in textiles, clothing and handicrafts). These industries 
constituted the most dynamic force for expansion in the economy creating new wealth 
and employment for millions of former peasants. However, as we shall see below, there 
is a widespread view that the rate and manner of this expansion caused enormous 
macroeconomic difficulties for which role these industries now face serious problems. 
TABLE 2 : Output of consumer products industries, 1983-1987 ( miltion units) 
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 
Refrigerators .300 .400 .620 1.100 4.100 
BW TV sets 6.820 10.000 16.150 14.500 19.750 
Colour TV sets .550 1.100 4.650 4.550 6.250 
Cameras .730 .625 .800 1.350 1.400 
Washing machines 3.010 6.100 8.350 8.340 10.000 
Sewing machines 11.000 9.650 9.900 9.800 9.800 
Source : Comp1led from data prov1ded by State Statistical Bureau 
Sast Project 1 Report on China · Page 37 
Decision Base 
11.3. OVERALL EXCELLENT TRADE PERFORMANCE 
As noted above, a central focus of the reform effort was on foreign investment and trade 
expansion. There can be little question that reforms and policies directed at this area of 
the economic activity had a profound impact. Taking the area of trade performance first 
we can see that from the perspective of export-oriented economies such as South Korea 
or Thailand, China has historically exhibited a relatively low dependence on trade. 
However, during the decade of reform, international trade came to play an absolutely 
central role in modernizing the economy and sustaining growth and investment. As Table 
3 shows, the rate of expansion in total trade has been notable starting from $28.2 billion 
in 1978 to $113.9 billion in 1989. This is roughly equivalent to an impressive 28 per cent 
of GNP, up markedly from the 15-18 per cent average of earlier decades. 
TABLE 3: China's merchandise trade, 1979-1989 ($billions) 
Exports Imports Total 
1979 13.2 15.0 28.2 
1981 20.1 21.3 41.3 
1983 21.0 20.0 41.0 
1985 28.0 40.2 68.2 
1987 39.1 40.7 79.8 
1989 51.9 62.0 113.9 
Source : Chinese customs statistics, various years 
Table 3 also records the growing strength of China's export capabilities and shows the 
accompanying scale of import growth that had attracted so much interest on the part of 
foreign equipment suppliers. Between 1982 and 1989, exports grew at an impressive 
annual rate of 16.8 per cent over this period from $9.8 billion to $39.4 billion and placing 
China 16th among world exporters - up from 32nd in 1979. This performance 
demonstrates the success of Chinese policies to encourage exports via the provision of 
support to both domestic export-oriented firms and foreign enterprises - who for example 
saw their export earnings double between 1 986 and 1 987 to $1 billion. 
On the import side, there was a fourfold increase in imports from $1 0.9 billion to $43.2 
billion over the 1982-1989 period. This was equivalent to a 14 per cent annual rate of 
growth (17 .6 per cent between 1978 and 1988). The continually rising trade deficit 
through this period reflects the country's commitment to massive imports of capital 
equipment as well as the effects of the relaxation on consumer imports in 1984-85. The 
widening trade gap followed by a sharp slow-down in import growth, particularly in 
1985/86 and 1989/90 also reflects the government's ability to abruptly reign in imports 
when macroeconomic conditions worsen. 
Tables 4 through 6 show different dimensions of China's commodity trade performance. 
Table 4 shows the changing commodity composition of exports and demonstrates the 
growing share of manufactured goods in overall exports between 1975 and 1986 - and 
which had grown to an estimated 72 per cent by 1989. Tables 5 and 6 show the principal 
elements of China's imports and exports over the 1 982-86 period as well as a more 
detailed breakdown for the latest year on which comprehensive statistics are available, 
1988. These tables demonstrate that China is still at an early stage of industrialization, 
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with a high concentration on traditional manufactured exports such as textiles and clothing 
and heavy continued dependence on imported industrial equipment. 
Table 7 captures the importance of China as a market for Western and Japanese capital 
goods imports in the mid 1 980s when imports into the rest of the developing world were 
declining rapidly. Table 8 gives more details on this aspect of China's imports and shows 
the extremely rapid growth in imports of engineering and related services between 1 982 
and 1 986 broken down by type of contract. 
·TABLE 4: Commodity composition of exports, 1975 to 1986 
Year Primary products Manufactured goods 
(% of total exports) (% of total exports) 
1975 56.4 43.6 
1978 53.5 46.5 
1981 49.6 50.4 
1983 43.3 56.7 
1986 36.3 63.7 
Source : Almanac of China's foreign economic relations and trade (1987) 
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TABLE 5 : Composition of exports and imports by commodity categories, 1982·1986 (%of 
total} 
Export item 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 
I. Primary goods 44.97 43.28 45.66 50.58 36.43 
-Food 13.01 12.84 12.37 13.89 14.38 
- Beverages & tobacco 0.43 0.47 0.42 0.39 0.38 
- Non-food raw materials 7.40 8.51 9.26 9.70 9.40 
- Mineral fuels 23.78 20.99 23.06 26.11 11.90 
- Animal&vegetable oils, etc 0.35 0.47 0.55 0.49 0.37 
II. Manufactured goods 55.03 56.72 54.34 49.42 63.57 
-Chemicals 5.35 5.63 5.22 4.96 5.60 
·Textile & light industry, minerals & rubber products 19.25 19.64 19.33 16.42 19.02 
- Machinery & transport equipment 5.65 5.49 5.71 2.82 3.54 
- of which power machinery & electrical appliance 0.73 0.74 0.70 0.43 0.60 
- special machinery 2.09 1.31 1.22 0.74 0.77 
- telecommunication & consumer electronics 0.52 0.92 1.29 0.34 0.79 
- other transport 1.36 1.64 1.76 0.77 0.47 
- Miscellaneous 16.57 17.12 17.97 12.74 15.99 
- of which clothing 8.70 9.27 10.15 7.49 9.41 
- camera & watches 0.55 0.77 0.74 0.23 0.36 
- other 4.79 4.64 4.72 3.17 4.03 
Ill. Other products 8.21 8.84 6.11 12.48 19.42 
Import item 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 
I. Primary goods 39.56 27.15 19.00 12.52 13.17 
-Food 21.78 14.59 8.51 3.67 3.79 
- Beverages & tobacco 0.67 0.22 0.42 0.49 0.40 
- Non-food raw materials 15.61 11.50 9.27 7.66 7.33 
- Mineral fuels 0.95 0.52 0.51 0.41 1.17 
- Animal & vegetable oils, etc 0.55 0.32 0.29 0.29 0.48 
- Metal ores & scraps 1.02 1.13 1.15 1.30 1.56 
II. Manufactured goods 60.44 72.85 81.00 87.48 86.83 
-Chemicals 15.22 14.88 15.46 19.58 8.79 
Textile & light industry, minerals & rubber products 20.25 29.41 26.70 28.16 26.09 
- Machinery & transport equipment 16.61 18.64 26.43 38.43 39.11 
- of which power machinery & electrical appliance 0.66 1.09 2.15 3.13 2.74 
- offices machines & data processing eqpt. 0.85 1.27 3.01 2.46 1.30 
- telecommunication & consumer electronics 2.05 1.64 4.13 5.97 3.24 
- other transport 
- Miscellaneous 16.57 17.12 17.97 12.74 15.99 
- of which scientific instruments 1.45 2.84 2.39 2.08 2.53 
- cameras & watches 0.45 0.48 0.68 0.94 0.76 
- other 0.52 0.72 1.06 1.25 0.86 
Ill. Other products 5.84 6.26 8.10 5.81 8.41 
Source : Trade and price statistics in 1987, State Statistical Bureau 
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TABLE 6 : Major traded commodities, 1988 
Exports %of total Imports %of total 
Textile yarn & fabrics 13.6 Industrial machinery 
Clothing 7.9 Iron & steel 
Petroleum & products 7.1 Electrical machinery 
Textile fibres 3.5 Fertilisers 
Vegetables & fruit 3.4 Cereals 
Fish 2.0 Telecommunications & 
recording equipment 
Animal feed-stuffs 1.8 Road vehicles 
Oilseeds 1.4 Other transport equipment 
Cereals 1.4 
Coal & coke 1.2 
Source : Econ. information and consultancy Co., China's Customs Statistics, 1988 
TABLE: 7 ~· h:ripo'rts of capitaf goods.in China and 
· developing countries, 1981-1986 
.. · 
Developing China 
countries 
1981 127 
1982 120 
1983 104 
1984 101 
1985 95 
1986 98 
Source : UNCTAD Trade and Development report, 1987 
TABLE 8 : Engineering and related sales contracts to China, 
1982-1986 ($ million) 
Complete plant 157.0 250.5 581.2 
Technical licenses 37.8 110.5 182.4 
Technical services 39.9 183.3 128.5 
Consultants .8 8.0 6.6 
Cooperative production 4.7 10.4 51.2 
3.2 
2.4 
3.1 
4.8 
10.2 
11.3 
2234.3 
219.8 
12.9 
8.9 
485.4 
Source : R.E.Gillespie, "Foreign Engineering opportunities in China", China Business Review, 
sept-october 1988 
16.6 
8.4 
4.2 
4.2 
3.4 
3.3 
2.7 
2.1 
3651.8 
419.4 
235.8 
12.1 
36.4 
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11.3.1. MAJOR PROBLEMS liE AHEAD 
While the above data gives the impression of a perennially expanding import market in fact 
the prospects for even a medium term continuation of this trend are not as strong as 
suggested by the recent sustained slackening in overall import growth. Total imports were 
down an estimated 20 percent in 1989 and in the first four months of 1990 had slumped 
an additional 17.8 per cent over the 1989 figures with Japan suffering the sharpest decline 
in orders down 37.5 per cent followed by the EC and the Soviet Union both with an 13.2 
per cent while the U.S., Hong Kong and Canada all registered increases. 29 
Obviously a good deal of this decline is due to import cutbacks imposed by the authorities 
in response to recent economic problems but we believe it unlikely that imports will soon 
return to their former levels. The latest Chinese forecasts call for a much reduced rate of 
import growth at around 5.5-7.5 per cent through the 1995. At approximately $69-$75 
billion, this would still be $25-$30 billion greater than in 1989 and indicates China will 
remain a significant export market. It does, however, represent a dramatic decline from 
import growth rates of 14 per cent and more in the 1980s. 
11.3.2. EXPORTS REPRESENT A BRIGHT FUTURE 
The story with relation to exports is a very different one. Prior to Tiananmen Square, 
manufactured exports had not only been booming but China had begun to successfully 
diversify its export base beyond traditional products such as textiles and handicrafts. Partly 
this was lead by export-oriented foreign firms. First Hong Kong manufacturers of toys, 
luggage and low-end consumer electronics products (such as cassette recorders, 
phonographs and TVs) began to set up shop in the mid 1980s in the SEZs and other "open" 
cities and areas followed by Japanese, Korean and North American electronics and 
telecommunications firms. One piece of evidence that captures this effect is given in Table 
9 which shows the scale and growth in SEZ exports between 1986 and 1989. 
TABLE 9 ~ Exports from special economic zones, 
1986-1 989 ( $ million) 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
400.84 
607.30 
987.50 
952.87 
Source : Elizabeth Cheng, "Down but Not Out", Far Eastern 
Economic Review, 8th February 1990, p.38 
Domestic firms played a major role in exporting more technology intensive products as well. 
For example, they are significant players in the machinery and electrical products sectors 
which registered $8.3 billion worth of exports in 1989 - an increase of 35 per cent over 
1988. Of this total, $1 .21 billion was earned from metal products, $2.58 billion by 
processing and assembling imported materials, and most significantly $4.32 billion from 
29
• On the import side, steel imports were down by 50 per cent, consumer durables by 62 per cent (of which 
colour TVs down by 87 per cent) and cars down by 18 per cent- all areas where Japan is a dominant supplier. 
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machinery and electrical equipment, instruments and meters (up by 40.7 per cent) and 
making this the dominant product category in the group and including 19 products whose 
export value exceeded $1 00 million. 30 
The contribution of more technology-intensive products in the export mix has thus 
improved considerably, rising form approximately 4 per cent in the early 1980s to about 
20 per cent by the end of the decade. In addition to this, China has enjoyed a modest but 
significant rise in exports of technology via licensing. These rose from less than $20 in the 
five period up to 1984 to approximately $112 million by the end of 1988. 31 
It is now clear (from a vantage point at the end of 1990) that despite a sharp downturn in 
mid 1989, China's trade performance has resumed its upward trend, registering a surplus 
of $1 .31 billion in the first four months of 1990 compared to a deficit of nearly $4 billion 
a year earlier. Based on a combination of tighter import controls, growing international 
competitiveness, and continued government support for exports, this trend should continue 
through the 1990s. 
11.3.3. TRADE PATTERNS BY COUNTRY 
As shown in Table 10, in 1988, Hong Kong was China's major trading partner, followed 
by Japan, the EC, and the U.S. This ranking has been consistent over the last few years. 
Of more interest are Tables 11 and 12 which break down the commodity composition of 
Chinese trade with these countries between 1 982 and 1 986, and give a more detailed 
comparison between the U.S. and Japan for 1988. There are many aspects of the 
country/regional pattern of Chinese trading relations worthy of comment. Among the more 
important from our perspective are: 
- the expected pre-eminent role of Hong Kong historically rests on re-exports, trade in 
services, the extensive and early involvement of Hong Kong firms in setting up 
production for export of low value added goods; more recently it depends on the 
growing synergy between the Chinese and Hong Kong economies. Interestingly, the 
Chinese connection has also been responsible for the growing strength of Singapore as 
a trading partner. Its total trade in 1988 of $2.5 billion brings it into sixth place 
exceeded among European countries only by Germany. 
- the increasingly strong European export performance allowing Europe to retain a trade 
surplus with China throughout the period of reform; the marked shift in the composition 
of EC exports to China away from manufactured goods towards higher value-added 
machinery and equipment with manufactures and machinery accounting for 54 per cent 
and 20.2 per cent respectively in 1978 and 24.8 per cent and 57.0 per cent respectively 
in 1986; and China's continued dependence on labour intensive manufactures (such as 
textiles - 28 per cent of exports in 1984 and 1986) as its main export to the EC. 
30
• At a mora aggregate level, sectors averaging an export volume in excess of $1 billion were petrochemicals, 
textiles, farm and related products, machinery and electronic products. 
31
• See for example Eric Baark, "China's Technology Exports, • The China Business Review, August 1988. 
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- the sharp differences in U.S.-China and Japan-China trade. From 1984-88 Japan 
exported more than three times as much to China as did the U.S. ($57 billion compared 
$18.5 billion) with Japan maintaining a multibillion dollar surplus over that period ( $26.4 
billion net) while the U.S. increased in deficit over those years from $400 million in 
1984 to $4.2 billion in 1988.32 
- this unevenness in trade performance between the U.S. and Japan is further 
compounded by extreme differences in the composition of trade. As Table 12 shows, 
Japan tends to export a high percentage of high value-added manufactured products and 
imports a large share of raw material and inputs, the U.S. tends to export raw materials 
and commodities and imports finished manufacturing products. 
TABLE 10 : China's leading trading partners, 1988 
Exports to %of total Imports from %of total 
Hong Kong 39.4 Hong Kong 21.9 
Japan 16.7 Japan 20.0 
EC 9.9 EC 14.7 
Socialist bloc 7.6 - of which Germany 6.2 
USA 7.1 USA 12.0 
Middle East 4.8 Socialist bloc 8.0 
A SEAN 5.9 A SEAN 5.5 
- of which Singapore 3.1 Canada 3.4 
Australia 2.0 
Source : Economic Information and Consultancy Co., China's Customs Statistics, 1989 
32
• Underlying this deficit is the spectacular growth in Chinese exports to the U.S. growing from $324 million 
in 1978 by tenfold to $3.38 billion in 1984 and then taking a quantum leap to $9.27 billion in 1988. 
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TABLE 1 1 ~ Chinese commodity trade with leading trading partners, ( $ 1 00 million) 
Hong Kong Japan u.s. EEC 
Export trade 1981 1986 1981 1986 1981 1986 1981 1986 
Total exports 56.7 101 48.6 61.1 15.4 26.3 25.3 39.9 
I. Primary products 21.8 23.2 38.2 48.3 6.2 6.6 11.3 10.9 
II. Manufactured goods 34.9 77.8 10.5 14.6 9.2 19.7 13.9 29.1 
Chemicals 2.1 3.5 2.1 2.6 1.0 1.6 3.6 4.3 
Textile, menerals & rubber 16.6 24.9 4.8 5.5 3.1 5.3 4.7 6.1 
products 
Machinery & transport 3.1 4.2 0.1 0.2 .49 .77 .18 .51 
equipment 
of which: 
- power machinery 0.1 0.2 - - .02 .04 .02 .02 
-special machinery 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1 .14 .02 - .02 
- telecommunication & 0.8 1.9 .01 .05 .02 .04 - .03 
consumer electronics 
- electrical machinery 0.8 0.9 .03 .08 .03 .07 .03 .03 
- other transport 0.1 0.1 3.5 5.6 4.5 11.2 5.4 7.5 
Miscellaneous 
- of which clothing 5.2 4.6 2.2 4.0 3.6 8.6 2.6 4.3 
-footwear 0.6 0.9 0.2 0.3 .19 .36 .42 .60 
- cameras & watches 0.8 0.8 
- -
.02 .01 .08 .07 
-other 5.4 5.1 0.8 1.1 .54 1.7 7.9 2.2 
II. Other products 0.1 32.1 .03 .72 .01 .80 - 10.5 
Import Trade 1981 1986 1981 1986 1981 1986 1981 1986 
Total imports 12.7 56.9 62.8 124 47.6 47.2 27.7 76.6 
I. Primary products 0.6 1.8 2.6 3.06 32.5 6.7 3.8 3.8 
II. Manufactured goods 12.1 55.1 60.2 147* 15.1 40.5 23.9 72.8 
Chemicals 0.2 1.3 5.9 8.4 5.3 6.9 7.8 9.3 
Textile, minerals & rubber 1.9 8.9 16.3 45.5 5.9 2.9 3.5 16.3 
products 
Machinery & transport equip. 2.4 8.5 35.1 85.5* 2.6 25.6 11.4 43.6 
of which: 
- special machinery .44 3.2 26.7 19.7 1.3 9.2 9.9 27.5 
- offices machines & data .17 .41 0.42 4.85* .37 3.11 .22 .23 
processing eqpt 
- telecommunication & 1.3 2.1 2.88 19.3. .14 .67 .05 1.98 
consumer electronics 
- other transport .07 .23 0.98 3.6* .39 11.9 .46 5.19 
Miscellaneous 3.0 1.85 6.2 1.1 1.1 4.5 .88 3.4 
- of which scientific .04 .26 0.91 3.53 .73 3.5 .61 2.7 
instruments 
- cameras & watches .33 .70 0.57 1.44 .12 .61 .06 0.3 
- other .26 1.6 0.34 1.02 .11 .34 .19 .38 
Ill. Other products 6.8 33.3 0.97 1.20 .31 .49 .23 .18 
• : estimates 
Source : Compiled from China Trade and Price Statistics, 1987, State Statistical Bureau 
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TABLE 12 : Japanese and U.S. China trade by commodity, 1988 (% of total) 
Exports to China Japan 
Vehicles 8.2 
Industrial machinery, parts 10.0 
Telecommunication and sound recording eqpt 11.1 
Specialized machinery 14.0 
Electrical machinery 16.6 
Iron & steel 39.7 
Organic chemicals -
Fertilizers -
Cork-wood -
Cereals/cereal preparations -
Artificial resins/plastics -
Imports from China Japan 
Iron & steel 8.3 
Vegetables/fruit/fish 9.3 
Textile fibres 10.3 
Textile yarn/fabrics 15.8 
Clothing 17.6 
Petroleum/products 38.8 
Source :Adapted from T. Thurwatcher, "Japan in China", The China Business Review, 
January-February 1990. 
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10.5 
14.6 
14.6 
19.8 
25.5 
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-
8.0 
-
22.3 
37.7 
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11.4. FOREIGN INVESTMENT PROSPECTS- BUILDING CONFIDENCE 
AMONG THE INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS COMMUNITY 
As attested to by the prominence given to the Open Door policy throughout the 1 980s, the 
leadership has consistently placed great emphasis upon attracting foreign investment to 
China as a means of gaining access to both foreign capital and foreign technology. Not 
surprisingly, foreign firms had initially a very enthusiastic response to the opening up of the 
Chinese economy and there was considerable euphoria in the early years over the prospects 
afforded by China's massive domestic market. Table 13 shows the slow start and then a 
massive jump in the number of investment agreements of different kinds signed in the 1980 
- 1987 period as well as giving available details of the amounts invested across different 
types of agreement. Tables 14 and 15 show the distribution of agreements across sectors 
with manufacturing dominating and across countries where the dominance of Hong Kong 
entrepreneurs is clear right from the start. 
TABte·i3 ~·AnnuaHoreign investment in China, .1980-1987 (number·ot liwestmE!rlj~; · 
· · .. ·$·million}· .· ·· ·· · · · · ·.-::· · 
.·· 
Type 
Equity joint ventures 
- Number of investment 20 28 29 107 741 1300 892 1399 
- Value of investment 63 28 29 188 1060 2027 1375 1920 
Co-operative ventures 
- Number of agreements 320 70 402 331 1089 1500 582 786 
- Value of investment 500 1300 926 504 970 2189 1358 1286 
Wholly foreign-owned 
ventures 
- Number of agreements 33 15 26 46 18 45 
- Value of investment 4 99 32 20 470 
Joint oil development 
- Number of agreements 4 0 1 18 0 4 6 3 
- Value of investment 1112 0 170 1031 0 143 80 4 
Source : Chen, Nai-Ruenn, Foreign investment in China : current trends, 1989; various Chinese sources 
In 1986 there was a sharp contraction in foreign investment activity. The contraction 
occurred partly because of growing disillusionment by foreign investors with the difficulties 
of actually doing business in China and partly in response to the economic difficulties of 
the 1984-85 period. Three things happened to change this picture. First, after a short 
period of restraint in 85/86, reform driven economic activity picked up again making 
domestic prospects brighter. 
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TABLE 14: International equity ventures in China by country, 1980-1987 
(%of total) 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 
Hong Kong 55 57 72 73 82 71 69 
u.s. 10 18 10 9 6 7 9 
Japan 15 7 - 5 6 11 14 
EC 10 7 14 9 2 4 7 
Other 10 11 4 4 4 7 1 
Source : Chen, Nai-Ruenn, Foreign investment in China : current trends, 1989; various Chinese 
sources 
67 
10 
16 
5 
2 
TABLE 15 : International equity ventures in China by sector, 1980-1987 {% of total} 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 
Agriculture 5 11 - 1 6 4 5 2 
Manufacturing 65 57 66 57 61 68 68 67 
Services 
- Oil related - 14 3 10 2 4 8 6 
- Engineering 2 4 14 7 3 9 9 10 
-Tourism 20 4 7 8 10 6 4 5 
-Other 8 10 10 17 18 9 6 10 
Source : Chen, Nai-Ruenn, Foreign investment in China : current trends, 1989; various Chinese sources 
Second, the Chinese government also responded to the growing unhappiness of foreign 
investors by implementing the October 1986 "Provision to Encourage Foreign Investment". 
This law made concrete improvements in the overall investment climate as well as 
decentralizing responsibility for foreign investment negotiation and export administration. 
Other adjustments were made to the treatment of intellectual property and technology, 
investment and joint venture contracts that also improved the investment climate. 33 
Third, more significant than legislation and institutional change was the cumulative effects 
of the protracted "learning process" that foreign firms and the Chinese authorities had gone 
through since the Open Door policy was launched. These new conditions began to become 
manifest in 1987 and by 1988-89, though all the problems had by no means been 
eliminated, both sides had learned how to negotiate with each other, to have realistic 
expectations about what was possible and to live within certain limitations imposed by the 
33
• There is an extensive literature on this subject. See for example the comprehensive review of the treatment 
of intellectual property in 1986 in Jamie P.Horsley, "Protecting International Property", The China Business 
Review, November-December 1986; and David B. Kay, "Trademark Update", The China Business Review, 
July-August 1988 as well as the articles by Gao Hang and Chris Oechsli in the same volume. 
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wider Chinese context. Most importantly, foreign business people felt they were dealing 
with a stable economy and government and with an open and manageable system. 
Consequently, it is true to say that before Tiananmen, even in the face of increasing 
domestic difficulties and the 1988-89 austerity programme, there had been a boom in 
foreign investment. Between January 1 987 and June 1989 the number of contracts signed 
grew by 400 per cent and their unit value by 67 per cent over the totals accumulated from 
1979-86. In the first half of 1989, foreign investment was up by nearly 50 per cent. This 
included an estimated 41 0 contracts for wholly-owned enterprises signed in 1 988 for a 
value of $480 million (up from 45 and less than $400 million in 1987) and 423 allegedly 
signed in the firs six months of 1989. 
Importantly, an increasing share of this investment had begun to flow into capital and 
technology intensive projects rather than into the hotel and labour intensive assembly 
sectors. By 1988, the amounts actually invested by foreign firms had risen to above $2 
billion annually ($2.4 billion in 1988) from only a few millions in the 1970s. 
A very important dimension of foreign investment activity in China is that since the 
beginning of the Open Door Policy, foreign investment commitments have consistently 
exceeded actual investments. Thus for the 1 980-88 period, real new investment from all 
sources totalled between $1 5 to $1 8 billion while investment commitments totalled some 
$32 billion. A good rule of thumb is that until June 1989, only 40 per cent of investments 
commitments were actually fulfilled - since then the gap has risen by an unknown factor. 
As noted above, foreign investment activity is spread across a variety of forms. According 
to official Chinese statistics, there are now some 12,000 joint equity ventures, 8000 joint 
production operations and 1500 wholly foreign owned subsidiaries. However, again, these 
numbers have to be interpreted carefully since many of those counted by the authorities 
have no real substance. 
Table 16 gives the geographical distribution of foreign investment in China between 
1979-1987. Only two of the counties listed, Hunan and Shaanxi, are not on China's 
south/eastern coast thus indicating the success of the coastal development strategy and 
underlining the government's ability to direct foreign investment in the areas it desires. 
This implies the need for foreign investors to take seriously the new Shanghai/Pudong 
development strategy mentioned earlier. 
Table 1 "7 gives the top 1 0 foreign investors in China over the 1979-1988 period. The 
leading role of Hong Kong is clear as are the strong positions of the U.S. and Japan relative 
to European investors. Hong Kong is China's leading investment partner accounting for 
70.8 per cent ( $17.9 bn ) of all approved projects involving foreign partners between 1978 
and 1988. This ranking is mainly on the strength of investments in hotels and light 
assembly industries.34 Hong Kong is followed in second place by the U.S. with 8.5 per 
cent ($2.4 bn), Japan third with 4. 7 per cent ($1.3 bn) of the total and the EC with 3.9 
per cent ($987 mn). Japan while taking third place in terms value is second in terms of 
numbers of projects. 
34
• This aspect also explains Singapore's surprising showing in fourth place • 10 per cent of its investments 
are in hotels and real estate with the rest in services and light manufacturing. 
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TABLE 16 : Geographic distribution of foreign investment in 
China, 1979-1987 
Country % of total Country % of total 
Guangdong 61.0 Liaoning 2.2 
Fujian 10.0 Jiangsu 2.0 
Shanghai 3.0 Zhejiang 1.5 
Guangxi 2.9 Shandong 1.4 
Beijing 2.6 Shaanxi 1.1 
Trianjin 2.4 Hunan 1.0 
Source : China statistics monthly, November 1988 
TABLE 17 : leading foreign investors in China, 1979-1988 
Country Number of Total value Percent of total 
projects ($ million) foreign investment 
Hong Kong 13,421 17,874 70.8 
U.S.A. 647 2,398 8.5 
Japan 647 1,313 4.7 
EEC - 987 3.9 
Singapore 239 530 1.9 
Germany 55 333 1.1 
Spain 2 191 0.7 
Canada 55 162 0.6 
U.K. 54 160 0.6 
Holland 14 156 0.6 
France 50 147 0.5 
Source : Data supplied by MOFERT 
Japanese manufacturing investments tend to be concentrated in electronics, electrical 
appliances and electrical machinery and are a logical extension of the avalanche of 
consumer electronics products that poured into China in the mid-1980s from Japan; U.S. 
manufacturing investment involves a much larger variety of activities ranging from highly 
visible high tech projects across sectors such as motor vehicles, electronics, computers and 
advanced control equipment through a much larger presence in low tech sectors such as 
food processing, and apparel/shoe assembly. European investments tend more strongly 
to the medium-low technology end with some high tech exceptions in motor vehicles, 
electronics, flat glass, etc. 
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11.4.1. TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 
Accompanying the inward flow of foreign investment funds was an equally sizeable inflow 
of imported technology both embodied as part of the foreign investment and as arms length 
purchases of technology. This scale of this inflow dwarfed all previous importations of 
technology. For example, between 1970 and 1978, China signed nearly 300 contracts for 
imported technology valued at $9.9 billion- but very many of these were never completed 
and never paid for. In contrast, over the 1980-89 period, the government claims a real 
level of expenditure for imported technology in the region of $27 billion spread across more 
than 27.000 contracts. 
Of this expenditure, the government claims that it spent some $1 5 billion on imports of 
high technology involved in 7000 contracts. We believe this to be a rather overinflated 
figure and estimate (based on information from interviewees) that in fact only about 30 -
35 per cent of total technology import expenditure was allocated to imports of more 
advanced technology from the western economies and Japan. Though details on recent 
import patterns are hard to come by, Table 18 documents Chinese high technology imports 
by country between 1980 and 1986. These show a consistent rise in expenditure in 
keeping with Chinese policy commitments and a not surprising third place showing for 
European high technology exports behind Japan and the U.S. 
TABLE 1'8: .Know Chinese imports of high technoro·gyequlpmenti :· 
: .... ··: .. :;::·:. t9S0~1986 ($millions) . . . . .· :: 
Total 
Belgium 
Denmark 
France 
Hong Kong 
Ireland 
Italy 
Japan 
Netherlands 
Spain 
U.K. 
u.s. 
Germany 
Other 
930 
2 
6 
44 
11 
0 
11 
204 
10 
0 
129 
257 
175 
81 
674 
2 
5 
34 
11 
0 
11 
310 
10 
0 
70 
105 
43 
73 
581 1103 
3 1 
6 11 
40 32 
17 33 
0 0 
6 10 
176 279 
4 4 
0 0 
55 53 
145 514 
36 79 
93 87 
1422 
6 
16 
41 
114 
0 
23 
467 
7 
1 
76 
471 
96 
104 
3336 
28 
17 
238 
199 
1 
70 
887 
13 
5 
113 
1332 
214 
219 
3561 
73 
20 
192 
108 
3 
121 
1040 
24 
5 
139 
1085 
438 
313 
Source : U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, "China : Economic Performance in 1987 and 
Outlook for 1988", Washington, D.C., 1988 
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11.5. ECONOMIC RETRENCHMENT AND POLITICAL TURMOIL 
Despite the relative success of the reform programme, some very serious problems 
emerged during their implementation, particularly in the post-1985 period, that eventually 
led to the present economic and political crisis. Simply put, the reform process foundered 
on the inability (and often unwillingness) of the economy, bureaucracy, enterprises and 
individuals to cope with the enormous pressures for radical change that were placed upon 
them by the leadership. 
These problems became visible at both the macro and micro level. At the macro level, the 
most serious was undoubtedly the emergence of an unprecedentedly high rate of inflation 
that went from virtually zero in 1978 to an average of 10.3 per cent by 1985 and growing 
sharply to more than 20 per cent in 1 988 and close to 30 per cent in 1989 before the 
imposition of draconian credit restrictions which should at least halve it by the end of 
1990. 
The unbridled demand for consumption goods and decentralization of control over imports 
stemming from the reforms resulted in a ballooning of the country's foreign trade deficit 
to $14.19 billion in 1 985 though this stabilized by 1 987 to a lower but still uncomfortable 
level of $10-11 billion. In parallel, China's out- standing debt tripled between 1984 and 
1987 to nearly $32 billion rising to $40-45 billion in 1989.36 
At the micro level, economic reform in the rural and urban sectors fairly quickly ran into 
some very severe problems. In the rural areas, after the initial rush of success, the pace of 
reform was deemed to be too slow and partial particularly in relation to agricultural 
production per se - while the uncontrolled growth of household and collective enterprises 
placed enormous strain on the economy. In the urban areas, apart from some successes 
linked to the establishment of high tech industries, it proved far more difficult than 
expected to institute even the most basic reforms among the vast majority of state-run 
productive enterprises. 
Inevitably, reform of the price and incentive structure was most problematic. So much so 
that by 1988 the prices of most industrial products were still not reflecting their true 
scarcity value and many state-run industries remained hopelessly inefficient and unproduc-
tive. As a result, serious shortages of raw material developed, major transport bottle-necks 
emerged and huge stockpiles of unsaleable, poor quality goods piled up through the latter 
half of 1987 and all through 1988. As noted above difficulties also plagued the efforts to 
attract foreign investment with rates of new investment sharply off in 1985-86 over earlier 
years though a number of these problems were addressed and overcome by new 
regulations regarding foreign investment issued in October 1 986. 
35
• As a result of this situation, China faces a worrying period in the early 1990s when its annual debt 
repayments will be approaching $10 billion and its ability to refinance or rollover this debt will depend on the 
acquiescence of the international finance community- an uneasy prospect given the current political situation. 
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11.5.1. ECONOMIC AUSTERITY 
Despite this success on the foreign investment front, China's other economic problems 
were not so suscept.ble to amelioration via state fiat. By mid 1 988, it was clear that the 
reform process was at a critical juncture and the leadership was faced with a painful set 
of choices over the next steps to take. Despite earlier attempts at correction, the problems 
faced by the Chinese economy were widespread and fundamental. 
In response to this situation, a strict austerity drive was instituted in early 1 989 involving 
severe credit restraints, an abrupt slow-down in capital investment, a sharp cutback on 
imports and a reallocation of raw materials in favour of the state sector. This austerity 
programme had some impact on the economic front (and for instance led to a sharp 
reduction in inflation and a dramatic improvement in trade balances as imports were 
slashed) but it only exacerbated the political tensions referred to above. This unsustainable 
situation was ultimately resolved by the government's use of force in June 1989. 
Since then the economy has continued to struggle both with the restraining effects of the 
austerity programme, the continued imbalances caused by the earlier reforms and 
deep-rooted structural weakness and the debilitating effects of political uncertainty and 
decisions to slow and in some cases reverse the process of reform as discussed in Part 1 . 
Among the main features of the economic difficulties facing China are the following: 
- GNP grew by only 4 per cent in 1989, the slowest rate since 1976 and less than half 
of the rate of growth over the last five years. Underlying this was a contraction in 
industrial output growth from 20.7 per cent in 1988 to 8.3 per cent in 1989 - with 
industrial growth in the last quarter of 1989 up by only 0. 7 per cent; retail sales were 
down by 8.3 per cent in 1989; one government response to this slow-down has been 
to inject 25 billion yuan into the economy primarily to prop up inefficient state 
enterprises - this is two times what was needed in first nine months of 1989. 
- in the wake of this, it is estimated that 20 per cent of all state owned factories are now 
standing idle (virtually all such factories ceased producing for part of 1989) while 
productive activity in some specific sectors such as consumer durables, which had 
experienced some of the highest rates of growth in the mid-1 980s, had contracted by 
between 1 0 (bicycles and refrigerators) to 30 per cent (washing machines) while the 
computer industry is running at only 20-30 per cent of capacity; 
- the stock of rural township enterprises, who were directly targeted in the credit squeeze 
because of the their alleged contribution to overheating the economy has been sharply 
reduced by the bankruptcy of nearly 4 million enterprises in 1989/90. 
- credit restrictions and a downturn in demand led state and collective enterprises to slash 
their investment expenditures by 11 per cent in 1 989 compared to a rise of 1 8 per cent 
in 1988; 
productivity in the state-owned enterprises in 1 989 suffered a severe drop as well 
ranging between a 5 per cent decline Liaoning, an 8 per cent average decline in Peking 
and Tianjin and a 10.2 per cent decline in Jilin 
- the slump has continued in 1990 with a further 2.2 per cent fall nationally recorded for 
the first quarter of 1990. 
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- the employment capacity of the economy has also been greatly weakened. Between 
1 980-1 988 the Chinese economy generated an estimated 80 million new jobs -
equivalent to four fifths of the entire non-agricultural labour force in the EC! The 
contraction in economic activity over the last 1 8 months has sharply reversed this 
pattern. Some 8-9 million people have been thrown out of work by the collapse of 
millions of township enterprises since the beginning of 1989; the urban state enterprise 
and collective sector are also shedding labour - for example employment in these sectors 
was reported down by 700,000 in the months of January 1990 alone. 36 The scale 
of these lay offs and the likely continuance of the crisis for some time yet, means the 
ability of the economy to absorb the continual stream of new entrants to the urban 
labour force is now under serious pressure. 
- on the international scene, severe import restrictions contributed to the positive trade 
performance reported earlier. However, the authorities were nevertheless forced to 
introduce a 21 per cent devaluation in December 1989 -the first such devaluation since 
1986 - and only 11 months later were forced to enact an additional 1 5 per cent 
devaluation in November 1 990; both of these measures are designed to ease a 
burgeoning balance of payments problem that will be teetering on the brink of crisis for 
some years to come; 
- finally, and of particular significance to our interests, a direct result of Tiananmen Square 
has been a reduction in foreign investor confidence that has lead, temporarily at least, 
to a downturn in new investment projects and proposals. Planned foreign investments 
were down by 25 per cent in the 4th quarter of 1989 and, allegedly, by another 20 per 
cent in the 1st quarter of 1 990. It is reported that in the first six months of 1990, the 
foreign exchange value of negotiated foreign investments had in fact dropped by nearly 
32 per cent. 
36
• Workers also suffered the additional blow of havmg the1r bonuses cut and of being compelled to participate 
in a forced saving plan by having to purchase government bonds worth one month wages. 
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11.6. KEY POLICY INSTITUTIONS IN CHINA'S S&T SYSTEM 
Responsibility for civilian S& T matters in China is shared by a number of organizations. The 
State Science and Technology Commission (SSTC) is now effectively the Ministry for S&T 
and reports to the State Council, the highest in the land. SSTC's position within the 
government system vis a vis S& T has recently been strengthened by the planned 
dissolution of the Leading Group for Science and Technology in 1988- as noted the chief 
architect of the S& T reforms introduced in 1985. SSTC is the focus for S& T planning and 
implementation at a national level and acts as the central co-ordinating body for S& T 
activities in China. Consequently, it is directly or indirectly involved in most aspects of S&T 
development. 
On the planning side, SSTC co-operates closely with the State Economic Council (SEC) and 
the State Planning Commission (SPC) in identifying priority S& T projects necessary to fulfil 
the economic objectives of the National Plan. Similarly it works with line and 
socio-economic ministries to identify projects for inclusion in the National Development Plan 
and in the various national S&T plans that it produces. (See Table 19) Typically, each 
ministry has a department of science and technology responsible for S& T related activities 
and projects linked to the national plan. 
Similarly, each province has its own science and technology commission, as do some 
counties and cities with whom the national SSTC consults at the planning stage and then 
co-operates with at the execution stage. The power and competence of these local S& T 
commissions varies widely, with those in the southern regions and cities such as Guandong 
and Shanghai being the most powerful. 37 
At the risk of oversimplifying the Chinese system for organizing and administering S& T 
activities we would characterize SSTC as involved principally with the formal S&T/R&D 
network and with the generation of new knowledge and S& T solutions while the SPC and 
more predominantly the SEC now have a fair measure of responsibility for the diffusion and 
introduction of technology in the productive sector. 
The SPC is responsible for preparing the 1 and 5 year economic plans that govern the 
development of the Chinese economy and for ensuring the necessary human, financial and 
physical resources are available to execute the plan. This function involves the SPC in 
planning and implementing large scale (usually in excess of $5 million) strategic projects 
requiring technology importation and transfer. 
The SEC has traditionally implemented the plan and has taken a leading role in economic 
reform. It comes into direct contact with technology issues through its responsibility for 
overseeing the technological transformation of the established Chinese enterprise - efforts 
which inevitably involve importing technology. 38 During the just concluded Seventh 
37
• See for example the discussion in Saitch, op.cit. 
38
• Another important ministry whose activities have a highS& T component is MOFERT, whose responsibility 
is to plan and administer foreign trade. This brings it into direct contact with technology issues through its 
provision of advice to domestic and foreign enterprises seeking to import technology on the needs, domestic 
availability and international sources of technology and through its involvement in approving technology transfer 
contracts. 
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Five-Year Plan (1986-1990) it had responsibility for 3000 transformation projects as well 
as for some 14,000 technology import projects. 
TABLE 19 : Main Chinese science and technology plans and programmes 
Long-Term Plans 
1956-1 967 1st S& T Development Programme 
1963-1972 2nd S& T Development Programme 
1978-1985 3rd S&T Development Programme 
1986-2000 15 Year Programme for S&T Development Programme 
(incorporating the 863 Programme) 
Five Year Plans 
1980-1985 Sixth Five-Year Plans for Key R&D Projects 
1986-1990 Seventh Five-Year Plans for Key R&D Projects 
1991-1995 Eighth Five-Year Plans for Key R&D Projects 
State Priority S& T Project Plan (launched 1975) 
State Priority Basic Research Project Plan (launched 1985) 
State Priority Industrial Experimental Project Plan (Launched 1984) 
State Priority Technological Import & Digestion Project Plan (launched 1987) 
Source : Compiled from a variety of published and unpublished sources 
In addition to these established institutional S& T actors, the development of Chinese S& T 
is also often pursued through the establishment of special ad hoc groups set up to plan and 
then oversee S& T activities at the national, sectoral or topic level. This strategy is pursued 
both to focus national expertise on a problem area as well as to overcome the problems of 
bureaucratic malaise and cross-institutional rivalry that often bedevil the workings of the 
Chinese system for organizing S& T. Thus they are likely to include fairly heavyweight 
political players as well as top flight S& T expertise. The establishment of the Leading 
Group for Science and Technology is the best known case of this approach but there are 
others. 
One of the more successful and powerful of the sectoral leading groups is the one formed 
in 1983 with responsibility for the development of the computer and electronics industry 
as discussed below. Ad hoc expert groups have also been convened to assist in developing 
technology plans for specific areas - since 1983, they have been responsible for drawing 
up and overseeing implementation of technology policies in 14 fields such as energy, 
transport, communication, agriculture, machinery, raw materials, urban construe- tion, IT 
and biotechnology. 
11.6.1. OTHER KEY ACTIVITIES OF THE SSTC 
In addition to its national planning activities, the SSTC, along with the SPC and SEC, is also 
directly involved in the design, management and implementation of a large variety of special 
S& T related projects and programmes outlined either in the national plan or specified in 
specific S& T plans. The main thrust of SSTC' s activities in this area can be seen as one 
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of "science and technology push." and it currently operates five major programmes to 
stimulate S& T development that are described in more detail below in Section. 
The SSTC also operates a variety of smaller programmes to promote S& T modernization 
and has a direct role in implementing various aspects of the S& T reform process (described 
in Part 1) particularly those dealing directly with the management of R&D institutes. It also 
has responsibility for international S& T collaboration and currently oversees more than 50 
agreements with countries, regional governments and bilateral and multilateral 
organizations. These are discussed below. Annex 5 identifies the major departments of 
the SSTC and gives a further idea of the scope of the work of the SSTC 
There are three other major national S& T organizations that in theory come under the aegis 
of the SSTC but in reality act in very independent fashion. These are the Chinese Academy 
of Sciences, the National Natural Science Foundation and the Chinese Association for 
Science and Technology. Of these, the Chinese Academy and the National Natural Science 
Foundation are of particular interest and are described in more detail below. 39 
11.6.2. THE CHINESE ACADEMY OF SCIENCES (CAS) 
The CAS is the premier government scientific institution in China and was established in 
1949. It has gone through a variety of changes and was deeply affected by the S& T 
reforms described in Part 1 . The CAS now has three main functions. The first and most 
traditional is to act as an assembly of leading Chinese scientists, similar to the Royal 
Society, involving 352 academicians organized across five divisions (earth science, biology, 
maths and physics, chemistry, and engineering. Membership of the Academy is aspired 
to by most young scientists as it is the most prestigious scientific honour awarded in China. 
The second and most innovative function of the CAS was discussed in detail in Part 1 and 
relates to its role as a catalyst in the creation of a network of new scientific enterprises 
whose aim is to develop high-tech products; and to its direct involvement in applied 
co-operative research projects with universities, the defense sector, industrial ministries 
and local government. These activities have come about as a direct result of the reform 
process 
The third and predominant function is to act as a comprehensive nationwide research unit 
geared towards harnessing thee country's S& T capabilities to the tasks of national 
development. Its work is mainly devoted to natural science and basic research and it is the 
premier institution in both of these areas. This work is carried out through support of the 
research and related activities of a network of over 1 50 institutions comprised of 1 2 
regional branches, 1 23 research institutes, a number of scientific instrument factories, 
independent libraries and the Chinese National Science and Technology University. In 
addition to its direct responsibilities for this R&D network, the CAS often serves in a review 
and advisory capacity towards the S& T system and other government agencies not only 
39
• CAST serves as an umbrella organization for 150 national science associations and over 120,000 local and 
provincial S& T associations. CAST is principally concerned with the popularization of science (identified as an 
area for possible collaboration), the organization of international academic exchanges and continuing education. 
CAST organizes about 1500 S& T seminars a year of which 40-50 are of international status. 
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getting involved in planning activities but also assisting to evaluate the research activities 
and scientific capabilities of non-CAS research activities. 
CAS employs a total staff of 82,326. The composition of this workforce across CAS 
institutions and by area of activity is given in Tables 20. CAS approves the research 
budgets for these institutions and has some administrative control through this function, 
3-5 year independent reviews and its ability to appoint institute directors. Typically 
however, the research institutes themselves are very independent particularly in the wake 
of the S& T management and financing reforms described in Part 1 which lessened the 
ability of CAS to exercise control. 
TABLE 20 : Staff composition of the Chinese Academy of Sciences 
Category Number 
A. Total staff 82,326 
B. Employed in 123 research units 6,855 
of which scientists & engineers 37,006 
other S& T personnel 10,124 
C. Staff engaged in S& T activities 53,727 
of which scientists & engineers 34,987 
other S& T personnel 8,276 
1. In R&D tasks 
of which scientists & engineers 28,219 
other S& T personnel 7,618 
2. In S& T services 
of which scientists & engineers 4,330 
other S& T personnel 9,193 
3. In S& T management 
of which scientists & engineers 2,438 
other S& T personnel 1,929 
... Source : SSTC, Gu1dehnes to Chma's sc1ence and technology system, 1988, BeiJing, 
S& T documents press, July 1989 
CAS institutes are also of very uneven quality with some capable of world class R&D and 
others relatively far behind the frontiers of knowledge. Nevertheless, the CAS and its 
institutes taken together represents both the wellspring of the country's S& T capabilities 
(including much of the country's basic research and high tech R&D capabilities) and the one 
of the key mechanisms through the which the government pursues its S& T policy. 
For example, during the Sixth Five-Year Plan period, (1980-85) the Academy was a leading 
actor in the nation's key S& T projects. 27 civilian projects incorporating 441 subjects were 
undertaken involving 85 institutions and some 5600 S& T personnel while more than 50 
institutes undertook 200 military R&D projects. Under the auspices for the Seventh Five 
Year Plan, in addition to its central and continuing role in the National Key Labs Programme 
(described below), the Academy participated in 4 7 projects, 140 subjects and 529 topics 
involving 109 Academy institutes and 7000 scientific staff. 
The CAS is also a major training Centre for young scientists with 118 institutions offering 
master's degrees and 83 institutions conferring doctoral degrees. Since 1978, 3500 
graduate students have received CAS Master's Degrees and 820 Ph.D degrees. Between 
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1978 and 1987, the Academy sent 5.888 persons to study abroad of which one-third were 
postgraduate students. CAS is a also a major focal point for international scientific 
exchange and it has signed co-operation agreements with 50 foreign counterparts and 
universities which have in turn facilitated more than 5000 two way exchange visits per 
year with foreign scientists - five times the number in 1978. 
11.6.3. THE NATIONAL NATURAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION OF CHINA 
After 4 years of experiment, the State Council set up in 1986 the National Natural Science 
Foundation of China (NSFC) as part of its strategy to strengthen China's basic and applied 
basic research capabilities - as was discussed in Part 1. Though guided by the SSTC, the 
NSFC is independent from other administrative bodies and receives its funds directly from 
central government. Its objectives are to guide, co-ordinate and support basic research 
through the administration of a central fund provided by the central government. 
Before the establishment of the NSFC, unallocated state funding for basic research (i.e. not 
tied to state specified projects) stood at less than 50 million yuan annually ($) (out of a 
total spend on basic R&D of 800 million yuan in 1987). However the NSFC budget has 
grown steadily in the past three years to approximately three times that much in 1989 or 
around 150 million yuan. NSFC grants are used only for direct expenditure on research 
projects, not for wages and other expenses - if these were included, the amount of funds 
involved would be over 300 million yuan. Interestingly, the NSFC is allowed to clawback 
15 per cent of any profits arising from the exploitation of research it has funded. 
The NSFC is widely reckoned to have been one of the more successful S&T institutional 
innovations in China in recent years. The stability of the institution, the visible degree of 
political commitment to it by central government and related to this, its growing financial 
resources (expected to double in the first few years of the Eighth Five Year Plan) has 
attracted and given stability to the careers of many thousands of scientists engaged in 
basic research in China. This has immeasurably strengthened the core structure of China's 
basic research capabilities The growing importance accorded to NSFC is also indicative 
of the significance attached by central government to the strengthening of the country's 
basic research capabilities. 
Some measures of the NSFC performance are that more than 50,000 researchers operating 
in about 1000 institutions have received NSFC funds over the last three years via over 
1 0,000 projects; some 10,000 researchers have been trained and 27,000 post-graduate 
students supported through taking part in NSFC funded projects; some 32,000 papers and 
books of high academic merit have been published based on NSFC projects - one fifth of 
these by foreign publishers and journals; and finally NSFC has established 162 collaborative 
international projects under 51 agreements while hosting 57 international conferences in 
China in 1987, 96 in 1988 and over 100 planned for 1989. 
Equally important is the fact that the NSFC has taken the lead in breaking down the 
tradition of administrative departments making decisions regarding research projects - thus 
removing politics from this critical area of S& T development (at least until the events of 
June 1989) The majority of NSFC funding is allocated via an open competition to so-called 
"free application" projects. Any scientist can apply for an NSFC grant in any field. 
Evaluation of projects submitted for funding is carried out via a peer review mechanism 
involving 15,000 experts and a set of scientist staffed evaluation panels. 
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Projects are only supported if there is a guarantee by the scientist's institution that it will 
cover all necessary wage and related overhead expenses. However, the institutions cannot 
interfere in the projects; scientists are responsible to the NSFC only and only the scientists 
may decide how to use the grants provided and how to implement the projects. This is a 
truly revolutionary departure from the previous system of support for basic research which 
was riven by petty politics, allocation was made on the basis of non-scientific criteria while 
administrators were able to interfere with the conduct of the research and allocation of the 
grant. 
The NSFC supports three types of projects - free applications projects, key projects and 
major projects. The average support for free application projects over the 1986-1989 
period was approximately $30,000 and 8690 projects were supported over that period. 
80 key projects (selected from the above) received larger amounts (an average of $79,200 
because they were deemed to be of particular academic significance and have clear 
application possibilities. Major projects representing frontier R&D and oriented towards 
solving ley national problems received 30 per cent of total funds. Up to 1989, 56 major 
projects involving 400 topics had been approved at an average rate of $390,000 per 
project. The allocation of funds across disciplines for the 1986-88 period is given in Table 
21. 
TABLE 21 :Disciplinary breakdown of NSFC grants, 1986-1988 
(% of total) 
Discipline Share of total grant funds 
Mathematical & physical sciences 12.0% 
(including astronomy & physics) 
Chemistry and chemical engineering 17.9% 
Life sciences (including biology, 26.3% 
medicine, agriculture & aquaculture) 
Earth sciences 13.6% 
Materials & engineering sciences 16.6% 
Information & management 13.6% 
sciences 
Source : Li Guang Lin : "The National Natural Science Foundation of China", 
Science and Public Policy, vol 17, N ° .4, August 1990 
Interestingly, though 1000 institutions in all were supported through NSFC grants and 
China has more than 1 000 institutions of higher education and some 5800 R&D 
institutions, 70 per cent of the grants given by the NSFC were allocated to 131 CAS R&D 
institutions and 31 key universities directly under the State Education Commission In 
addition the 56 major project grants mentioned above were concentrated in 40 key state 
laboratories and 7 open laboratories. This indicates clearly that China's national capabilities 
in basic research are concentrated in a small number of institutions and that the NSFC is 
playing a key role in further developing these. Table 22 gives details of the NSFC grants 
(approximately $18 million) in 1987 that were directed towards high technology R&D 
projects in the CAS, "key" and "open" laboratories. We were informed during our 
interviews that NSFC would be pleased to discuss its priority areas for R&D co-operation 
with the EC. 
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TABLE 22 :Allocation of NSFC funds to high technology 
R&D projects, 1987 ($million} 
Field No. of projects Amount 
Biotechnology 36 4.14 
Space technology 24 2.19 
Information technology 42 3.08 
Laser technology 12 1.08 
Automation technology 35 2.52 
New energy technology 35 1.54 
New materials technology 44 3.31 
Totals 228 17.86 
Source : U Guang Lin : "The National Natural Science Foundation of 
China•, Science and Public Policy, Vol17, N°.4, August 1990 
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II. 7. SIZE AND STRUCTURE OF THE S& T LABOUR FORCE 
Statistics governing the size and composition of China's S& T manpower are incomplete, 
contradictory and often confusing. The most reliable data set relates to what are called 
natural scientific and technical personnel in state owned R&D units. These consist of 
science and technical graduates (in science, engineering, agriculture and medicine) of 
universities, colleges and secondary technical schools who have technical or scientific posts 
(including R&D), workers and peasants who have been promoted to do research or are 
engaged in education of production techniques, and people with the same qualifications 
who are doing administrative work related to S& Tin state-owned organizations, enterprises 
and institutions. 
By the end of 1988, China had a manpower stock of 9.66 million people in these 
categories, up from 7.35 million in 1984. Of these 800.000 are scientists and engineers 
directly engaged in scientific research and technology development. Between 1978 and 
1988 there was an 8.4 per cent annual increase in the stock of trained S& T personnel. 
11.7.1. STRUCTURAL PROBLEMS IN THE DISTRIBUTION OF S&T 
MANPOWER 
Both Chinese and foreign analysts have identified a number of severe problems relating to 
the internal structure of the S& T labour force which have been addressed during the reform 
period but which continue to plaque to system. Four of these are worthy of brief mention. 
First, there is a fairly massive shortfall of S& T personnel at all levels relative to the 
country's needs. This is particularly acute in high technology sectors but also affects other 
areas such as public health and agriculture. Second, the quality of existing S& T personnel, 
particularly engineers and related technical personnel, and their absorptive capacity is low. 
This is partly because of poor training but more because they have been kept away from 
exposure to modern methods and techniques for so long. 
Third there are serious distortions and imbalances between the nature and distribution of 
existing S& T personnel and the needs of the economy. One dimension of this is that there 
are not enough senior people in the system with technical expertise and management 
experience. Another is that the ratio between skilled and unskilled groups, between 
administrators, scientific and technical personnel and "scientific" workers with no formal 
training, and between high, middle and low skilled workers. This is largely a legacy of the 
interruption in training caused by the Cultural Revolution and of the way in which skilled 
personnel were given job assignments in the past. 
Finally, it is alleged that there is a serious problem of inappropriate allocation of people -
particularly with respect to the S& T capabilities of different sectors. In short, there are too 
many people working in the wrong fields and the wrong locations. The previous emphasis 
on the military and heavy industry meant that these sectors received a large share of 
qualified personnel while light industry and agriculture were and are seriously deprived of 
access to technical personnel. Another dimension of this problem is a highly uneven 
geographical distribution of S& T personnel characterized by very high concentrations in 
Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin and the industrial North-East. In Beijing and Shanghai, the ratio 
of engineers in state-owned units to the total municipal population in 1987 was 1 :55 and 
1:71 respectively while in Anhui it was 1 :649 and in Tibet 1:1037. 
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11.7.2. ADDRESSING THE PROBLEM OF LABOUR MOBILITY 
A key element of the S& T reform programme addressed directly this problem of S& T labour 
mobility. Under the old system, there was no job mobility. Once a scientist had been 
assigned to a job, it was to all intents and purposes, theirs for life. Further compounding 
the problem was the practice of many training institutions of identifying bright and 
promising students and then seeking to retain their services while letting go of the less able 
students. 
Such practices seriously constrained the diffusion of knowledge and resulted in the 
distributional distortions referred to above. The aim of S&T reform in these areas was to 
devise a set of mechanisms whereby talented S& T personnel could move to those places 
where their skills and expertise were valued highly and would be put to good use. Various 
measures were introduced including renewable contracts, the granting of freedom to S& T 
personnel to engage in consulting work, and so. Prior to June 1989, it was clear that these 
measures were beginning to enjoy considerable success. Leaving aside the issue of those 
S& T personnel who have left the state-supported R&D sector entirely, by the end of 1988 
some 485,000 S& T personnel has left their home institutions and taken up jobs in other 
organizations. 
11.7.3. THE HIGHER EDUCATION SYSTEM 
China has come a long way in the development of its higher education system particularly 
given the disruptions caused by the Cultural Revolution. By the end of 1987, there were 
1 063 full-time institutions of higher education up from less than 200 in the 1 950s .. 
Among these were 602 universities and colleges, 339 two or three year colleges and 122 
short-term professional colleges. 
There were 1.959 million students enroled in this sector and 385,000 tutors. Of these 
there were 106,185 graduate students, including 7319 Ph.D students, 92,215 M.A. 
students and 6,615 enroled in graduate courses. These numbers compare very favourably 
with only 300,000 full-time students in 1983, 37,000 graduate students, 18,000 masters 
students and only 29 doctoral candidates. The rapid growth recorded in the early-mid 
1980s is expected to continue. By the end of 1990, there are expected to be 2.6 million 
graduates from regular university course and 200,000 from postgraduate courses. 40 
Table 23 presents data on the distribution of S& T postgraduates across fields of study for 
1 988 and shows the extremely high degree of concentration in engineering and natural 
sciences. 
40
• Though large, the higher education sector is dwarfed by the primary and secondary education system. 
There are some 220 million pupils in China, with 10 million new entrants every year taught by some 10 million 
teachers of whom 8 million work in primary and secondary schools. 
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TABLE 23 : S& T postgraduates by field of study, 1988 
Field 
Natural sciences 24.5% 
Engineering & technology 40.3% 
Medical sciences 10.8% 
Agricultural sciences 7.6% 
Humanities and social sciences 16.8% 
Source : compiled from data provided by SSTC 
As with the higher education system in most developing countries, there are many 
problems. Perhaps the most relevant to our concerns is that despite the emphasis placed 
on developing China's high technology capabilities, educational opportunities in these areas 
are still relatively limited. For example, far too many students are still taking traditional 
mechanical engineering and agricultural courses as opposed to being able to specialized 
early on in electronics, computer science, biotechnology, materials science and information 
technology. Improvements are occurring coming but these are slow in coming. 
One notable exception is that, at least until June, 1989, there seemed to be an insatiable 
supply of students wishing to train abroad. During the second half of the 1960s and most 
of the 1970s only 1217 students had gone abroad for training. Between 1979 and 1985 
some 47,500 government sponsored students were trained abroad. Between 1985 and 
1988 this number had nearly doubled again. Two points should be noted. Despite the 
attraction of foreign countries, most students in fact return to China after their overseas 
training - or did until the Tiananmen Square massacre. Certainly a far higher percentage 
that compared with India. Second, 80 per cent of these were engaged in the study of 
science or engineering. Third, well over 70 per cent of overseas students go to the U.S. 
Page 64 - Sast Project 1 Report on China 
Decision Base 
11.8. THE SCALE AND SCOPE OF CHINA'S R&D SYSTEM 
China's state supported research and development system is composed of five major 
elements (once described as the "five front armies")- the Chinese Academy of Science and 
its affiliated institutes; the institutes associated with the higher education system under the 
direction of the Ministry of Higher Education; the institutes under the control of various 
ministries and state commissions; the national defense research sector and institutes under 
the direction of the local government system. 
Unfortunately, comparable, comprehensive and up to date data on the Chinese R&D system 
is not available beyond 1986. At that time the number of all R&D institutions affiliated 
with government departments at different levels stood at 8640, of which 5,394 were 
above the county level (up from 4006 in 1979). By 1988, the number of R&D institutes 
above county level had risen slightly to 5,671. These figures excludes those within the 
education system, institutes which are at or below the county level and thus under the 
control of local government, and those controlled by industrial enterprises. Table 24 gives 
further data. 
TABtE•24: China's R&D:institutions and distribution of personnel, 1988 
Total Scientists Other S&T Personnel 
institutions & staff engineers 
Total 5671 1043991 410456 210244 
R&D institutions above 5275 1017674 397245 203313 
county level 
Affiliation natural 4933 996342 383538 198936 
sciences & technology 
Social sciences & 342 21332 13707 4377 
humanities 
Information institutions 396 26317 13211 6931 
Source : Calculated from data supplied by SSTC 
Tables 25 and 26 summarize various aspects and characteristics of the state-supported 
R&D system above and below the county level. Among the interesting points to note are 
the numerical importance of R&D institutes at or below the county level and the 
predominance among these of relatively small institutes; compared to the numerically 
smaller institutes directly under central government or the CAS and their larger average 
size; the heavy bias towards agricultural R&D (accounted for by the activities of institutes 
at or below county level which are virtually all concerned with agriculture or rural industry). 
An element of interest not shown by the data is the sharp increase in the number of 
institutions under central government control between 1985 and 1986 (from 622 to 1 044). 
This increase is the result of the S& T reform process launched in 1 985 and represents the 
shift of a number of military R&D institutes to control of the civilian sector. 
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TABLE 25 : R&D institutions and their personnel in natural sciences and 
technology, 1988 
Total Scientists Other S&T Personnel 
institutions staff & engineers 
Total 4933 996342 383538 
Agriculture, etc. 1524 161322 46649 
Manufacturing 1904 504448 185379 
Geological 81 20711 11129 
Communication 127 26452 11777 
& transport 
Environmental 647 181886 89373 
Other 650 101523 39231 
Source : Compiled from data supplied by SSTC 
TABLE 26 :R&D institutions at or below the county 
level, 1985 
Number of Number 
institutions of staff 
Total 3267 77435 
Agriculture, forestry, fishery 2524 67782 
Industry 469 6268 
Geological 3 15 
Construction 12 280 
Communication & transport 4 60 
Other 255 3030 
Source : Statistical data on science and technology of 1985, 
Beijing, SSTC 
11.8.1. CHINA'S CORE R&D CAPABILITIES 
198936 
28895 
94535 
3822 
5509 
35318 
30857 
We have already highlighted the three main dimensions of what we consider to be the core 
of China's high tech and leading edge R&D and S& T capabilities. These are to be found 
in the CAS institutes reviewed above; in the network of national key labs and open labs 
that fall directly under the jurisdiction of the State Council as discussed in Part 1; and as 
also discussed in Part 1, in the emergence of the non-government R&D/S& T production 
sector with its orientation towards high tech research and production. Below we review 
the other four main elements of China's R&D system. 
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11.8.2. R&D CAPACITIES IN THE HIGHER EDUCATION SECTOR 
The research institutes associated with the higher education sector are the weakest 
element in the Chinese R&D system. This derives from the historical separation between 
research and education that was adopted as a policy in the 1950s and not fully abandoned 
until the middle of the 1980s. At the end of 1987, there were 1076 full-time institutions 
of higher education in China which included fully-fledged universities offering the full range 
of disciplines, polytechnic universities specializing in science and engineering, and 
specialized institutes for particular areas of technology. The total budget for the higher 
education system in China, including R&D came to approximately $6.6 billion in 1988. 
However, the historical lack of attention to research in higher education and the lack of 
adequate financing for education as a whole let alone the limited provision of funds for 
advanced research in this sector has meant that the promotion of research in these 
institutions has encountered considerable difficulties. Neverthe- less, an estimated 976 
higher education institutions were engaged in some form of scientific research in 1989. 
This was carried out among 1 514 R&D organizations of which 641 were research 
institutes and 831 research laboratories. The State Education Commission funds 36 of 
these universities directly, including the key and superkey universities, another 200 are 
funded by government departments and the remainder by the provincial or county 
governments. 
A number of measures have been taken to strengthen research capabilities in the higher 
education sector. Direct subsidies for the support of R&D provided by the central 
government have been added to the educational budget since 1979. Beginning in the early 
1980s, the government adopted a practice, abandoned during the Cultural Revolution, of 
supporting a select group of "key" and "superkey" universities as centres of scientific 
excellence. By the mid 1980s, approximately 90 universities had been accorded the status 
of key universities and another 7 identified as superkey universities and selected as sites 
for government funded laboratories. Among those superkey universities were those of 
Tsinghua in Beijing and Xian Jiaotong in Shanghai. 
Key and superkey universities are marked out for the reception of extra funds and are 
regularly involved in national key research projects. For example, a World Bank loan of 
$200 million in 1981 was used to purchase instruments and computers for training and 
research in 26 key universities. This pattern of strengthening select universities through 
specific resource allocations tied to research has been expanded considerably through the 
national key labs programme described earlier. In this context it is important to note that 
in the aftermath of the reform process, the strengthening of key universities via provision 
of additional funding and the award of research contracts is done on the basis of the track 
record of the university and the quality of the staff. 
However, it is not only the key universities that are receiving greater support. State funds 
allocated to R&D in higher education as a whole have gone up significantly in the last few 
years from $202 million in 1986, to $257 million in 1987 and up again to $325 million 
in 1988. The SEC provides less than 4 per cent of these monies with the rest coming from 
the SPC and the SSTC. 
In addition to this greater help from the state, a number of universities have strengthened 
their capabilities on their own initiative by responding aggressively to the governments 
urging to all R&D institutes to establish greater links with the local community and the 
productive sector. As early as February 1984, some 25 major universities and colleges had 
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signed over 50 long-term contracts with government and industry and had set up 30 
scientific enterprises (as described in Part 1) to combine research with production. Some 
of the technically more competent universities have gone on to develop a wide variety of 
projects and contracts with the industrial sector. 
11.8.3. RESEARCH INSTITUTES UNDER MINISTRIES 
Research institutes that operate under the control of the ministries are primarily engaged 
in applied and developmental research. As a rule they do relatively little basic research 
though this is sometimes undertaken. Typically, they are administered either by ministry 
headquarters from Beijing or by its local or municipal bureau. At the end of 1987, there 
were some 922 research institutions under the direction of the ministries and the state 
councils with a total staff of roughly 450,000 of whom slightly less than half were 
classified as S& T personnel. 
The Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Husbandry and Fisheries and the Ministry of Public 
Health have their own academies that administer fairly large numbers of research institutes 
- the Chinese Academy of Agricultural Sciences and the Chinese Academies of Medical 
Sciences and Traditional Medicine. In addition to these major academies, there are other 
smaller academies under ministerial control such as the Academies of Forestry, Geological 
Sciences, Railway Research, Petroleum Exploration and Development, and Space 
Technology. 
Most industrial production mm1stries (26 in total) have their own research and training 
institutions as do the State Council Bureaus (15 in total) concerned with industry. Among 
the most notable research institutes attached to these ministries are the Research Institutes 
of Coal-Mining, Aeronautics and Petrochemical Engineering. 
Some of these ministry based S& T networks are characterized by a large and well-defined 
research structure composed of engineering and design institutes, colleges and technical 
schools. For example, in the case of the Ministry of Chemical Industry, the network 
includes 1 80 chemical research institutes of which 23 are run by ministry headquarters in 
Beijing, 8 by state-owned complexes and the rest by local ministry offices and provincial 
authorities. 
11.8.4. RESEARCH INSTITUTES UNDER PROVINCIAL CONTROL 
As noted above, there are a large number of research institutes that fall under the 
administrative control of the provincial or county governments. Indeed they constitute the 
second largest group of institutes in the country and are meant to act as the local conduit 
for the translation of national S& T policy as it relates to agricultural and rural development 
into technical solutions suitable to local conditions. 
As of 1986, there were approximately 3260 such institutes. Of these, some 1300 
institutes were specifically concerned with agriculture, fishery, forestry, animal husbandry 
and agricultural mechanization at ·prefectural level and above, employing 133,000 people 
of whom 42,500 are S& T personnel. Below prefecture level, there are just 500 county level 
institutes plus 11 0,000 dissemination stations and 700,000 workers. 
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This may seem a large number but in fact the ratios are very modest - in 1 989 there were 
only 6.6 agricultural S& T personnel per 1 0,000 agricultural population, one technologist 
per 7000m of cultivated land, while two thirds of all villages have no resident agricultural 
technician. Moreover, the local S& T system has been plagued by many problems not least 
of which is lack of resources. As noted above, these R&D institutions tend to be much 
smaller than the institutes in either the Academy or State Council sectors and in 1 987, 25 
per cent of them had less than 20 personnel engaged in S& T activities - the absolute 
minimum necessary to do any good. Moreover, many of the S& T personnel, particularly 
those working in institutes below provincial level, are poorly trained. Consequently, the 
effectiveness of many of these R&D institutes and the local S& T commissions who direct 
their activities has long been severely constrained. 
Nevertheless, In terms of the structure of the Chinese economy, the key role played by the 
agricultural sector and the emphasis given to the sector in the country's overall 
development strategy, these R&D institutes are of central importance to China's 
development efforts and their activities have been the focus of considerable S& T reform 
efforts since the mid 1980s. 
However, given their largely agricultural and rural focus and the applied nature of their work 
and their overwhelming orientation towards domestic technology generation and 
application, they are of limited interest to our concerns - though the government has 
mounted a major programme called SPARKS which is designed to transform the rural sector 
through the rapid development and diffusion of appropriate technology and the mobilization 
of largely local human and financial resources. 41 
11.8.5. RESEARCH CAPACITIES IN THE DEFENSE SECTOR 
Despite the openness of recent years, Western analysts still know relatively little about the 
actual size and capabilities of the defense R&D establishment. However compared to the 
civilian R&D sector, the defense R&D sector is reputed to have more and higher quality 
scientists and technical personnel; more and better equipment and instrumentation; and it 
has enjoyed greater financial and political support that has contributed to its successes in 
nuclear weapons and space technology. Thus we are certainly talking about a defense 
R&D sector that involves numerous large and well equipped R&D institutes and thousands 
of top flight scientists. There appears to be considerable technological competence in the 
fields of atomic energy, radio-isotope, remote sensing, space technology, 
telecommunications, laser, automatic control and precision mechanical engineering, new 
materials and a variety of analytical and testing technologies. 
The counterpart of SSTC on the defense side is the National Defense Science, Technology 
and Industry Commission established in 1982 as part of the reform process. A key aim of 
these reforms was to reorient military R&D to better support the civilian R&D and 
production effort. This is being accomplished both by fiat and directives and by the 
introduction of the contract system. Though there has been considerable opposition to 
these changes, information available to us indicates that significant strides have been made 
in this direction. 
41
• See Conroy, 1989 op.cit for a discussion. 
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There are numerous reports in the press of military institutes that have either transferred 
technology to the civilian sector or have reoriented a significant share of their output in that 
direction. One recent report is that over the last 8 years some 30,000 items of arms 
technology have been transferred to the civilian sector realizing a gross output value of 11 
billion yuan ( $ ); while the proportion of civil products produced by the national defenseS& T 
industry has increased to 66 per cent in 1989 from 8.1 per cent in 1979 at annual rate of 
improvement of 20 per cent. 42 
One argument made to us is that as a result of being drawn into closer contact with the 
civilian "market", the defense R&D establishments as a whole are now more competitive 
than the CAS institutes. Certainly there appears to be no slackening off in the pressure 
being applied to this sector to improve both its capabilities and its orientation to the 
productive sector. For example over the last 12 months, the Commission for National 
Defence has set up 19 "field groups" to oversee key projects in photoelectronics, new 
materials, computers, etc. involving new expenditure of hundreds of millions of yuan. 
Experts involved in these groups are drawn from more than 50 R&D institutes, many of 
them from the CAS and higher education R&D network. 
11.8.6. INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNIZED SCIENTIFIC CAPABILITIES OF 
LIMITED PRACTICAL USE 
The scientific prowess of the Chinese R&D system is well recognized. In terms of 
achievements to date these are many and widespread ranging from the country's notable 
accomplishments in space and nuclear technology in the 1960s and 1970s, its perennial 
excellence in theoretical physics and mathematics, world leadership in many areas of the 
geological sciences and its more recent internationally recognized breakthroughs in 
superconductivity, laser technology and quantum well structures. The very large number 
of international scientific exchanges and collaborations that have been established with 
leading universities and scientists throughout the world are indicative of the quality of 
Chinese science. 43 
At the institutional level, scientific excellence is still concentrated in a relatively few 
number of favoured institutions - though with the establishment of the national key and 
open lab programmes, the rota of world class scientific institutes in China can be expected 
to expand considerably. Typical of the institutions recognized internationally for the 
excellence of its science, staff and facilities in the Institute of High Energy Physics of the 
41
• One particularly Important group of ministries whose R&D and production engineenng capab1lit1es constitute 
a critical S& T resource for China grew out of the relatively recent reorganization of the once dommant Mmistry 
of Machme Building and 1ts combination w1th the Mmistry of the Ordnance Industry. A new State Commission 
of the Machme Industry was formed along With five separate miniStries all with specialized machme bu1ldmg and 
technology development responsibilities that are implemented through their capt1ve network of research institutes 
- the Mm1stnes of the Nuclear Industry, Aeronautics Industry, Electronics Industry, Astronautics Industry and the 
Chma State Shippbuildmg Corporation. The State Commission has been given responsibility for Implementing a 
maJor new policy for the technological development of the machme building industry. 
43
• Citation analysis conducted specifically for th1s project indicated that out of 11,738 sc1ent1flc papers 
published by International journals between 1981 and 1986 with Ch1nese authorship, 24 per cent mvolved 
collaboration w1th overseas scientists- the h1ghest f1gure for any developmg country. The U.S. was the largest 
single collaborator with a nearly 50 per cent share, Community countnes colleectively accounted for 21 per cent 
and Japan for 1 0 per cent. 
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CAS in Beijing is a good example. The Institute employs 2000 people of whom 1 000 are 
scientists and engineers. It is the site of a newly established electron-positron collider 
supporting world class synchotron radiation research and nuclear physics. 
Another example is the Xian Institute of Optics and Precision Mechanics employing more 
than 1000 people. Devices developed at the Institute include an opto-mechanical high 
speed camera, image converter, streak camera and image intensifier for medical uses. The 
streak camera for example has a resolution of 300 femtosecond in single shot and 1 . 1 
picosecond for synchroscan operation - equivalent to or better than anything else available 
in the world. It has also developed a femtosecond ring dye laser pumped by a Beijing made 
YAG laser - an impressive technical accomplishment - though as with so many scientific 
developments in China, the developer still was not clear on what its precise uses would be. 
This in a nutshell captures China's main S& T problem - and one that the whole of the S& T 
reform process described in Part 1 was aimed at changing. The list of China's scientific 
accomplishments and the pool of recognized technical excellence in China is inordinately 
large by developing country standards. We could fill dozens of pages with this information 
- the listing of projects and leading institutions given in the appendices where the 
authorities would like to see greater EC related collaboration only scratches the surface. 
It is of course, also the case that these resources stand out from amongst a much larger 
sea of mediocre individual and institutional S& T capabilities. Nevertheless, recognized 
Chinese R&D capabilities are relatively easily identifiable and provide ample basis for 
straightforward R&D collaboration. However as discussed in part 1, the crucial area where 
China is weakest and where S& T co-operation would be most beneficial from the Chinese 
perspective is at the interface between R&D and production where existing links are 
notoriously weak. In one sense, the precise fields of such collaboration matter much less 
than does the development of projects which can bring together European and Chinese 
capabilities in a successful link between R&D, production and the markets. 
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11.9. GROWING EXPENDITURE ON S&T 
Getting any sort of concrete estimate of China's expenditure on S& T is notoriously difficult. 
Good quality, disaggregated, interna-tionally comparable statistics are difficult to come by 
and rarely published. Nevertheless the available data does indicate that China's expenditure 
on S&T activities, though gyrating fairly widely, did rise as a percentage of GNP between 
1949 and 1979 from less than .1 per cent to around .5 per cent. 
However it is only in the last twelve years that the government has begun to allocate a 
significant share of state resources to S& T. Our best estimate is that the state budget 
allocated to civilian science (incorporating both R&D and capital construction projects) has 
risen by at least 15 per cent annually since 1979, more than doubling by 1985 and on 
course to double again by the end of 1990;. 
In 1988, the last year for which there are comprehensive figures available, total national 
expenditure on S& T activities amounted to 14.45 billion yuan ($3.2bn) just over 1 per cent 
of GNP of 1401 . 5 billion yuan and up from . 76 percent in 1982. Of this 7.4 billion yuan 
( $1 . 61 bn) can be counted as direct state investment in R&D through the state supported 
R&D institutions. The rest of the investment would have been allocated to various capital 
construction as well as monies channelled to S& T activities via regional science 
administrative agencies. 
While this figure is low compared to other advanced developing countries such as South 
Korea, it is nonetheless a significant amount because of its rapid expansion since the 1960s 
when S& T expenditure was just under .3 percent of GNP. This greater expenditure on S& T 
is directly related to the leadership's firm commitment to strengthening S&T as part of its 
modernization drive. Tables 27 and 28 provide details of the government's S& T allocations 
for 1988 - the latest date for which this data is available. 
TABLE 27 : Government R&D allocation by institute 
and field of study ( $ millions} 
Total 
R&D institutions above county level 
Natural sciences & technology 
Social sciences and humanity 
Information institutions 
Source : Compiled from data supplied by the SSTC 
1,992.76 
1,926.26 
1,876.45 
49.72 
66.59 
One concrete indication of the government's willingness to channel an ever greater 
proportion of funds to S& T is to be found in the threefold rise in expenditure on targeted 
R&D programmes between the Sixth Five Year Plan for Key R&D Project to which 1.5 
billion yuan was allocated and the Seventh Five Year Plan for Key R&D Projects to which 
5 billion yuan has been allocated. Some 76 key S& T tasks were identified under this plan 
and about 30 per cent of the funding earmarked for civilian S& T will be directed towards 
these projects. 
Another indication is the growing commitment to the support of basic R&D via the funding 
provided by the NSFC - as discussed above. A final sign is that despite the current 
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TABLE 28 : Government R&D allocation by types of research - Basic, applied and 
experimental development ($ millions) 
Total fund Basic Applied Experi-
input research development mental 
Total 575.03 50.66 234.14 290.23 
R&D institution above 90.00 1.82 19.02 69.15 
county level 
Institutes directly under 485.03 48.84 215.12 221.08 
control of State Council 
- of which Chinese 99.56 30.04 47.93 21.57 
Academy of Sciences 
Source : Compiled from data supplied by the SSTC 
economic difficulties faced by the country, our interviewees were adamant that there would 
be no cutback in the planned S& T allocation over the next few years. Indeed the 
leadership apparently remains committed to increasing the funds available for S& T activities 
at a faster rate than the growth in general expenditure throughout the period of the Eighth 
Five Year Plan. 
11.9.1. FINANCIAL SYSTEM REFORMS 
It is probably worth noting briefly here that one of the broadest and most ambitious areas 
of reform involved the question of financing S& T activities in general and R&D activities in 
particular. Though many individual steps were taken, the basic thrust of S&T funding 
reform dealt with the relative contribution of central government. The government is 
seeking to reduce substantially the past practice that 99 per cent of all required funds 
would be provided by central government. Consequently it is seeking to reduce each year 
(since 1986) the amount of funds provided to R&D institutes for operating expenses. R&D 
institutes are in turn expected to gradually increase the share of operating costs that they 
raise from other sources by the active seeking of research contracts and consultancy 
arrangements among enterprises and in the marketplace .. 
Directly related to this the government is seeking to do away with past practices of 
allocation of resources where no attention was given to merit or quality. From 1987 
onwards, an ever increasing share of resource allocation via government sponsored projects 
was to be done on the basis competitive tendering and bids. Moreover, basic and applied 
research institutes , particularly those linked to the CAS and key universities typically too 
far removed from the market to raise large amounts of money from contract research are 
being required to adhere to a contractual system providing certain guarantees of delivery 
and performance. 
Given the extent and longevity of past government support, these changes represent a 
fundamental break with the past. This is particularly the case in relation to applied R&D 
institutes operating close to the final market or working directly for sectoral enterprises, 
ministries or state commissions. While some level of central funding will remain, there 
appears to be a firm intention to reduce the level of government support of these institutes 
as much as possible. 
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11.1 0. CHINA'S INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN S& T: AN AREA OF 
STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE 
As should be clear by now from earlier remarks, international co-operation in S& T is 
extremely important to China. The leadership sees China's forward progress in its 
modernization drive as critically dependent upon continued access to international flows of 
S& T. This comes through in the importance attached to commercial technology transfer 
through foreign investment and the massive expenditures during the 1980s on arms length 
technology transactions documented earlier. 
The same level of significance is attached to formal S& T co-operation. Since 1978, China 
has expended considerable diplomatic effort on securing and expanding bilateral and 
multilateral co-operation in S& T. For its part, China has grown increasingly generous in 
offering reasonably wide access to Chinese S& T and areas of particular interest to foreign 
scientists. However, at the same time China has also garnered a formidable reputation for 
its relentless pursuit of S& T co-operation agreements that serve its own clearly defined 
purposes in terms of knowledge acquisition in areas of priority importance to Chinese 
strategic development objectives. In this sense, the Chinese differ dramatically from the 
Indians who attach little strategic significance to international co-operation. 
Given this background, it is not surprising that China has now compiled an impressive 
catalogue of international S& T co-operation agreements. Since 1978, China has engaged 
in bilateral and multilateral S& T co-operation and exchange with 1 08 countries and has 
formally concluded inter-governmental S& T agreements with 56 countries. Under these 
umbrella agreements, China has established literally hundreds of protocols between 
counterpart ministries and agencies. For instance there are 27 protocols with the U.S.; 28 
with Germany; 35 with France 17 with the U.K, 35 with the Soviet Union and 5 separate 
agreements with different DGs of the Commission. Moreover, the Chinese Academy of 
Sciences has signed 50 agreements of co-operation with academies of science and 
research organizations in 26 countries; while China has joined over 280 international 
academic organizations including those under the auspices of the U.N. and ICSU. 
Over the years, the level and forms of international co-operation have gradually expanded 
in many directions In 1988, China registered a total of 14,300 ongoing scientific and 
technical projects of co-operation with other countries. China has given increasing 
emphasis to academic exchanges between senior scientists and these have grown rapidly 
during the 1980s. In 1989, it registered a total of 47,800 exchanges split 50/50 between 
Chinese scientists going abroad and visits to China by foreign scientists. Given this level 
of activity, it is difficult if not impossible to generate any balanced assessment of the 
relative costs and benefits of S& T collaboration to China and r'3r collaborators. Clearly, 
China's own development efforts have been aided significantly and many examples can be 
given including those arising from EC funded projects. Similarly there has been 
considerable improvement in the effectiveness of the operation of the institutions and 
systems in place in China to facilitate co-operation. 
And as China's own S& T capabilities have developed, so too has the importance to foreign 
countries of S& T co-operation with China. Not surprisingly, the Chinese officials 
interviewed were also keen to see expanded co-operation with the EC develop as a result 
of the SAST initiative. This willingness on the part of the Chinese to explore further S& T 
co-operation with the Community is certainly to be welcome. However, in the wake of the 
events of June 1989, such offers need to be evaluated carefully by the EC from a strategic 
perspective that incorporates political as well as scientific factors. 
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11.11. THE DEVELOPMENT OF CHINA'S HIGH TECH CAPABILITIES 
China began development of its high tech capabilities during the late 1950s as part of its 
strategy for building national defense capabilities. These efforts continued through the 
1960s and 1970s and allowed China to lay down a basic production infrastructure and 
achieve a degree of R&D proficiency. 44 However beginning in the late 1970s, the 
leadership has devoted an increasing degree of policy and planning effort on the further 
development of high tech industries. These industries are now accorded a critical role in 
China's industrialization process over the medium to long term. 
The development of these industries has been pursued through a wide variety of policies, 
programmes and institutional initiatives. These include some general efforts already 
mentioned such as the 863 plan, the TORCH programme, the Seventh Five Year Plan for 
S& T Development, the national key labs programme, and the stimulation of the scientific 
enterprise sector, as well as others which are more sector specific such the creation of the 
Leading Group on the Electronics Industry, the VLSI Plan, the creation of a mechatronics 
(a Ia Japan) ministry in 1988 (the Ministry of Machine Building and Electronics Industry, 
and the launching of sectoral strategies for high tech industries such as electronic 
components, bioengineering, telecommunications and computers. 
The government has been increasingly willing to back up these plans with growing 
investments in R&D and production. The cumulative total investment in all aspects of the 
development of high tech sectors during the 1980s (including production and R&D) has 
been recently estimated as exceeding 1 00 billion yuan - or approximately 6.3 per cent was 
these sector, with the bulk of this coming in the last five years or so. So far these 
estimates have not translated into a major increase in production - estimated output of high 
technology products in 1989 was less than 5 per cent of total industrial output with 
exports only a fraction of this. Nevertheless, there is great hope that the groundwork has 
now been laid, and that high tech industries will come to play a dominant role in the future. 
Official expectations are that by the year 2000, the output of high tech industries will reach 
about $20 billion in value. 
China's high tech potential cannot be denied. The surfeit of plans and policies shows a 
great deal of effort is being invested in charting future progress. And there is undoubtedly 
an impressive accumulation of scientific expertise and capabilities locked up in the many 
R&D labs where high tech work is going on. However, when considering the actual status, 
production capacity and competitiveness of these industries, it is clear that China has a 
very long way to go yet before it can even begin to fulfil its ambitious plans. 
The bias towards R&D capabilities but a limited production base is painfully obvious in 
biotechnology where it conducts world class research in a number of leading edge areas 
such as plant cell and tissue culture, control of plant viruses and X-ray crystallography but 
where it is ten years behind in the development and implementation of production 
44 Its capabilities in defense-related technologies such as space (where it has had 25 successful launches). 
satellite communication, lasers, optical fibres (It no longer lays coaxial cable) and nuclear technology are well 
known and highly regarded. 
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technologies. 46 Because of the low level of Chinese capabilities, direct foreign investment 
is likely to be very welcome in the area of production or production equipment where there 
is still as yet remarkably little foreign involvement. 
China's state electronics industry is considerably further advanced but still faces many 
problems. Though the focus of a sustained planning effort and backed by substantial 
political will, the industry is still falling far short of the technology and production targets 
that have been set as well as being well behind international standards. Output has 
undoubtedly increased fairly rapidly. The total value in 1988 was about $13.43 billion, up 
from $11.51 billion in 1987 and a six fold increase since 1978 and suggesting an annual 
average rate of growth of about 31 per cent. These figures include low technology 
consumer electronics products which have been China's biggest success story so far. 
The total size of state-supported civilian electronics sector numbers about 3000 factories, 
130 research institutes, and 6 dedicated universities focused on electronics. Some of the 
computer enterprises are among the largest firms in the electronics sector. The Great Wall 
Computer Group for example consists of 58 production units, 4 R&D institutes and 5 
university departments. Though there are several hundred state-owned computer 
producers, 75 per cent of computer and software production is accounted for by the top 
ten firms. There is a small but significant foreign presence in computers and automation 
technology that was established during the mid-1 980s and is primarily oriented towards the 
domestic market.46 During 1990, six large joint ventures involving some of the biggest 
international computer firms were formed. Some of the major co-operative ventures are 
listed in Table 29 and some of the newer more export-oriented foreign ventures are 
discussed below. 47 
Exports are small but growing from around $180 million in 1987 to a planned $800 million 
in 1990, of which slightly less than half will be software exports and most of the remainder 
low tech consumer electronics products. Imports grew rapidly from 1980 to 1985 and 
were then sharply curtailed in 1985 and again in 1987 as China's planners decided that the 
country should aim for greater self-sufficiency in electronics as well as saving badly need 
foreign exchange. Approximately $2.5 billion was spent on all forms of imported IT 
45
• Biotechnology development 1s undoubtedly a priority despite these problems. There has been a ten fold 
increase in its allocation of R&D resources between the S1xth, Seventh and Eighth Five Year Plans. The focus of 
this work is on three areas- development of new high yieldmg and disease resistant varieties of an1mals and plants 
to greatly increase meat, fish, gram and dairy production; development of new medicines, vaccmes and gene 
treatments; and protein engmeering. See Dean H. Hamer and Shain-dow Kung, "Biotechnology in Chma: Summary 
of a Report", Chma Exchange News, December 1989. 
~. One interesting recent development is the rapid mcrease in the degree of co-operatiOn between German and 
Chinese universities in computer R&D. Computer scientists from Munich Technical Umversity, Berlin University, 
Hamburg University, the University of Bremen and Bochum University have all recently become involved in 
China-related computer R&D projects. A German language journal on Chma and computing has also been 
established. 
47
• See also L.Curry, "Computer makers go in search of Chinese goodw1ll", p.8, Financial Times, February 20, 
1991 for a more recent review of the activities of foreign computer compan1es in China. 
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TABLE 29 : China's major computer manufacturing joint ventures 
Partners Value/split Products 
Allen-Bradley (US I/ NA Automation control products 
Construction & Development 50/50 
Corp of Xiamen 
Foxboro Co. (UKI/Shanghai $ 15 million Process control instruments 
Meters&lnstruments Co. 49/51 
Hewlett-Packard (US)/ $ 5 million HP 3000 superminis 
Beijing Computer Corp 50/50 
IBM (USI/Ministry of Electronics NA IBM 5550 PC 
Wang Labs (USI/Shanghai $ 6 million Wanbg minis & Chinese 
Computer Industry 60/40 workstation 
Japan lnt'l sortware NA Computer software & hardware 
Corp/China computer 
Systems Engineering 
Proficient Enterprise $ 580,000 PCs, electrical & electronic 
Co (HKI/Huagan Development Co. products 
Rail Air Ltd (UKI/NA $50 million Microcomputer systems 
LSI design; assembly & testing 
of IC devices 
Semi-Tech Microelectronics $ 270 million Microcomputers 
Corp (Canada)/Shenzen 
Electronics Group 
Yun Hoi Trading Co (HKI/ NA Microcomputers, electronic 
Linfen Electronics Factory horns, TV signal eqpt 
Zhaohua Electronics Co (HKI/ $ 323,000 Microcomputers 
Fushun Hualian Computer Corp 
Source: adapted from Kelly Ho Shea, "Computer Investments", China Business Review, 
March-April 1988 
products during the Sixth Five Year Plan and less than half of that during the Seventh plan 
period. In computers, imports rose from less than $100 million to $815 million in 1985 and 
collapsed to $525 million in 1 986 and below $400 million in 1987.48 
It is however at the level of sectoral performance where the problems are revealed most 
sharply. If we consider the integrated circuit sector, it is clear that there are well laid plans 
and that the sector has been the focus of consistent efforts to develop technology and 
increase production.49 Mainly through the importation of production lines output was 
48
• The surge in computer imports through 1985 did not bring widespread computerization to the economy. 
By the end of 1987, fewer than half of the country's 140,000 installed microcomputers were in use and another 
20,000 had not even been moved out of the warehouse. Lack of peripherals, software and particularly 
programmers was responsible. One recent estimate is that 100,000 programmers and 500,000 operators will 
be needed in the 1990s. See A.Bhalla, "Modernizing China", Science and Public Policy, August 1990. 
48
• For example, a VLSI plan was published in 1984 that set out a three phase programme for the development 
of VLSI capabilities: Stage 1 from 1986-90 involved mastering 3 inch chip and 3.5 micron technology and achieve 
mass production of 16 bit microprocessors and 4k CMMOS RAMs; Stage 2 from 1991-95 will require mastering 
4 inch chip and 2 micron production technology; achieving mass production of 64k MOS RAM and 32-bit 
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increased from 24 million units in 1983 to an estimated 100 million units in 1989. Yet 
domestic demand for semi-conductors was estimated at 600 million in 1 990 far 
outstripping local capacity - which is anyway severely skewed towards the supply of 
relatively low technology components. 
For example, China currently produces about 680 types of ICs in 30 different categories 
but it is mostly using technology from the late 1960 or early 1970s based or outmoded 
U.S. and Japanese designs. Only 6-7 per cent of the ICs produced in 1989 were medium 
and large scale circuits. Moreover Chinese ICs are five to ten times the cost of imported 
components and of poor quality - though there have been recent improvements reported 
and Chinese computer research scientists have achieved a number of notable 
milestones.60 Thus despite a still enforced government policy of restricting imports in 
order to improve performance, Chinese electronics industries are not only deprived of 
sufficient components but also have to pay high costs for the poor quality that is available. 
The computer sector feels the effects of these component supply problems more than most 
sectors and these are compounded by the demand dampening effects of economic 
retrenchment. Though there are conflicting estimates available it is clear that the industry 
has fallen far short of its output targets in the last few years. Last year only 1300 
minicomputers and 60,000 home designed microcomputers were produced. This is despite 
an annual capacity in micros of 300,000 units and an annual demand for 100,000. 
Similar problems of affect the minicomputer industry. Government sources estimate the 
industry overall is operating at less than 30 per cent capacity. Despite having experienced 
30 per cent annual growth rates for most of the decade, output grew by only 17 per cent 
in 1989 and has actually fallen by close to 1 0 per cent in 1990. This sort of performance 
will inevitably negatively effect the wider computerization of the Chinese economy. 
In response, the Ministry of Machinery and Electronics Industry has announced yet another 
set of plans to revamp the industry, increase capacity and achieve greater integration and 
concentration. New investments will be steered towards the largest of state-enterprises 
to allow the attainment of scale economies and to improve product quality. Private sector 
firms (minbans) will not benefit at all. The new plan calls for geographical concentration 
of the production of computers and components- computers in the Yangtze River delta and 
Shandong Province and components and software in southern China, particularly in 
Guangdong province, the Shenzen and Xiamen special economic zones and the Zhongshan 
high technology zone. 
To meet the unsatisfied demand for semi-conductors, the Ministry plans to set up 12 
semiconductor enterprises and six microchip plants in Peking and Jiangsu province, These 
will be complemented by a number of new joint venture projects reflecting the belief that 
expansion of the industry depends critically on imported technology and foreign investment. 
Wuxi Huajing Corp., the largest microchip producer, is importing technology from both 
Siemen and Toshiba to increase output from 40 million to 100 million units. NEC of Japan 
are involved in negotiations to set up a $200 million plant to produce 50 million high-end 
microprocessors; and focusing R&D on 5 inch and 1 micron technology; Stage 3 from 1996-2000 will see a move 
into VLSI production including mass production of 512k MOS RAM and 32-bit microprocessor. 
60
• See the discussion in Denis Fred S1mon, "lntegratmg the Electromcs Industry", The China Busmess Rev1ew, 
July-August 1988. 
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circuits by 1994. This represents a major technological leap for the industry. Other 
microchip joint ventures will involve Phillips, AT&T and Motorola. 
Given the size of the potential market, the undoubted scientific and technological prowess 
that exists in the research labs of the electronics sector, and the growing intensity of the 
government's committment, the prospects of the industry seem bright. 61 But then this 
has been the case for the last ten years. It remains to be seen whether the new plans will 
reverse the trends of the past and actually result in a substantive improvement in China's 
electronics capabilities. 
61
• On example of this prowess as well as illustrating the time lag in China's home grown computer technology 
is its 1988 version of the U.S. Cray- 1 supercomputer was faster and more reliable than that older model. 
Applications software is another area where technical virtuosity and time lags are characteristic. Such is the price 
China is prepared to pay for technological mdependence. See Cornelis J. Kuiken, "Chinese Data-Processing and 
the Chinese Computer Industry", China Information, Vol.lll, No.3 Winter - 1988/89 
Sast Project 1 Report on China Page 79 

ANNEXES 
ANNEX 1 - MAJOR AFFILIATED COMPANIES OF THE CHINESE 
ACADEMY OF SCIENCES 
ANNEX 2 - PRIORITY RESEARCH AREAS AND PROJECTS FOR CHINA'S 
863 HIGH TECHNOLOGY-DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME 
ANNEX 3 - PROJECTS IDENTIFIED AS SUITABLE FOR INTERNATIONAL 
COLLABORATION UNDER THE TORCH PROGRAMME 
ANNEX 4 - NATiONAL KEY LABORATORIES 
ANNEX 5 - SSTC MAJOR DEPARTMENTS AND FUNCTIONAL "OFFICES 

ANNEX 1: MAJOR AFFILIATED COMPANIES OF THE CHINESE 
ACADEMY OF SCIENCES 
Beijing Ke Hai Corporation - development, production and marketing of new products and 
technology in the electronics, light industry, machinery and bio-engineering fields. 
Beiiing Software Experimental Factory - design of software engineering technology. 
Blast Engineering Company - demolition engineering and development services offered on 
contract or consulting basis. 
China Sign-Optics Electronics Ltd - development, production and marketing of 
photoelectronic technology; technical consulting. 
Corporation for Scientific Instruments on Sensing Techniques - production of electrical 
equipment; remote sensor R&D; technical consulting; establishment of high tech joint 
ventures. 
Da Heng Company - contract R&D on optics and fine mechanics. 
Da Tong Company - development and production of computers and communications 
technologies. 
Hope !H) Computer Company - development of computer hardware and software; technical 
consulting; office automation equipment sales and purchases. 
Keiian Corporation Ltd. - manufacture of components and complete sets of NMR imaging 
and scanning equipment for medical use. 
Keli High Technology Corporation - contract product development and manufacture of 
microcomputers and systems using digital techniques. 
Keshen Corporation for Scientific and Technological Consultancy and Development- new 
product consultancy. 
San Huan New Material Research and Development Inc. - development and production of 
rare-earth magnetic materials. 
Science. Education and Technology Development Corporation - contract R&D relating to 
optical, mechanical and electronic technologies. 
Shenzen Science and Industry Park Corporation - contract development and production of 
high technology products. 
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ANNEX 2 : PRIORITY RESEARCH AREAS AND PROJECTS FOR CHINA'S 
863 HIGH TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME 
Below we present further information on the seven fields that have been identified as focal 
points for the 863 High Technology Development Programme which is under the leadership 
of Professor Ma Junru, Director-General, Department of Fundamental Research & High 
Technology, SSTC. Under each field the SSTC has identified a select number of major 
research topics (approximately 15) that will provide an umbrella for the development of 
other related disciplines and research branches. A select list of these major research topics 
has been given under each priority field according to the fields that have been identified by 
the SSTC as priority areas for international collaboration. We also give more details on the 
Automation Technology R&D component of the 863 programme in order to illustrate how 
the programme operates. 
BIOTECHNOLOGY 
1 . Development of high yield, high quality and adversity proof animals and plants. 62 
2. New medicines, vaccines and genic therapy 
3. Protein engineering 
SPACE TECHNOLOGY 
1 . Develop advanced launch vehicles with enhanced capacity for commercial services. 
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 
1 . Intelligent Computer Systems 
2. Optoelectronics devices and microelectronic optoelectronics systems integration 
technology. 
3. Information Acquisition and Processing Technology 
LASER TECHNOLOGY 
1 . Apply laboratory achievements to the development of applications for material 
processing, plasma technology, pulse power technology and high resolution 
spectroscopy. 
52
• Under which programme there are more specific objectives such as to: 
- develop hybrids of rice sub-species to average one ton per mu in double cropping; 
- develop new strains of high protein wheat, disease-insect resistant high protein vegetable varieties and 
high-protein, draught salinity tolerant herbage strains; 
- develop maize, soybean and vegetables strain with nitrogen fixation capabilities; and 
- develop new breeds of fast growing Jean meat hogs, disease resistant livestock and poultry. and disease-cold 
resistant fishes. 
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ENERGY TECHNOLOGY 
1 . Coal-fired MHO power generation technology to fully utilize medium-grade and 
high-sulfur coals. 
2. Advanced nuclear reactor technology development. 
ADVANCED MATERIALS 
1 . Photoelectronic materials. 
2. High performance structural materials with corrosion resistance and light weight. 
3. Special functional material 
4. High temperature-wear resistance and high strength composite materials. 
5. Development of special testing and measuring techniques. 
AUTOMATION TECHNOLOGY 
Under the automation technology programme, two main subject areas for work have been 
identified -computer-integrated manufacturing systems (CIMS) and intelligent robots (IR). 
A Directorate of Automation Technology has been set up (under the leadership of Zhang 
Yuzhen SSTC) reporting to the Department of Fundamental & High Technology of the 
SSTC. Under the Directorate there is one overall Expert Committee and two Expert Groups 
for each topic. To facilitate attainment of the objectives, two national research centres and 
13 national laboratories will be established by 1992. 
The CIMS project (Cui Deguang, Director, CIMS Office, Tsinghua University) has an 
Engineering Research Centre now under construction at the Tsinghua University while the 
IR project's chief engineering centre is located at the Shenyang Institute of Automation 
Control (Zhang Xiufang, Director). Among other institutions involved are - the Department 
of Aeronautics and Astronautics at Beijing University, Shanghia Jiao Tong University, Xian 
Jiao Tong University (Xian), the Beijing Research Institute on Machine Tools, South East 
University (Nanjing), Harbin Institute of Technology, (Harbin), The Institute of Automation 
(CAS-Beijing), the Hefei Institute of Intelligent Machine Research (CAS-Hefei) and Nankai 
University (Tianjin). 
Work is currently underway under 9 main project areas under the CIMS programme -open 
system architecture; development and diffusion strategy for CIMS in China; engineering 
analysis for product design, manufacturing and systems integration; flexible manufacturing 
engineering; CIMS quality control systems; management and decision-making system; CIMS 
database development; and CIMS systems technology. The intention is to have all key 
technologies necessary for demonstration of CIMS production line ready by 1995 and to 
have a CIMS demonstration product under operation by 2000. 
Work on the IR programme is going forward under 7 main subject areas - system 
architecture of IR; manipulator and driving mechanisms for IR; robot controllers and system 
integration; robot vision; force and torque sensor development; artificial intelligence; and 
new structural materials, energy sources and communication. Second generation robot 
prototypes will be developed between 1989 and 1 992 and the intelligent robot system will 
be developed between 1992 and 2000. 
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COLLABORATION UNDER THE TORCH PROGRAMME 
The directorate of the TORCH programme (based within the TORCH High Technology 
Industry Development Center, SSTC) has singled out 5 technical fields under which projects 
can be considered as TORCH projects. The five technical fields are - new materials, 
biology, electronics and informatics, mechatronics and new energy resources. 
For consideration as a TORCH project, the projects must either be based on mature 
research results or already patented technology ready for commercialization. Between 
1988 and 1989, more than 270 projects were classified and approved as national level 
TORCH projects and more than 1 000 as local TORCH Programme projects. From this set, 
127 projects have been identified as suitable for international collaboration with reference 
to both further developmental research and commercialization. For reasons of space, we 
provide below only a sample listing. Further details and a full listing can be provided if 
desired but direct contact should also be made with the TORCH Directorate at SSTC if 
serious explorations are under consideration. We understand that SSTC has already 
approached the Community about possible collaboration under TORCH on HDTV technology 
so further contact could be pursued through these channels. 
New Materials 
PBT wool imitation stable fibre 
Highly errosion-resistant Zn-AI coating materials 
DZR components 
Dual-axes directed polyimide membrane 
Microcrastatal glass 
High precision mirror copper tubes for refrigerator freezer and 
condenser 
Sensitive Agent for PS Printing Plate 
Biology 
CHIMEHERB - artificial skin 
Monascus pigment 
Factory-scale production of Thuringiensis 
Non-cariogenic palatinose 
Instant ELISA kits for Hepatitis 
Electronics and Informatics 
Raster digital display systems 
PSC-128 programmable subscriber line concentrator 
Thick fil hybrid and surface mount tech 
PTC thermal sensors 
LaB6 cathode 
TL-2 graphic measuring and calculating system 
GC-3 micro measurement system 
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Mechatronic 
Gold dopin plasma coating machine 
ZF2-3055 three dimensional auto-profile milling machines 
Acoustic oil displacement system and acoustic extracting vehicle 
New Energy Resources and Energy Saving Technologies 
Submerged electrical oil pump 
A new type of powder metallurgic titanium ball valve 
Scroll compressor for air conditioner 
Other Unclassified TORCH Projects 
New liquid jet mixing device 
HUAXIA integral drill rods 
Granular activated carbon regeneration furnace by forced discharged 
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The following is the most up to date list available of the network of world class laboratories 
being developed under the National Key Laboratory Programme which the SSTC have 
singled out as being focal points for international R&D collaboration. 
SPONSORING INSTITUTION LABORATORY SPECIALITY DIRECTOR LOCATION 
Beijing Medical University Natural and bionic Wang Ling Beijing 
medicines* 
Beijing University Artificial micro-structure 
physics 
Audi-visual informatics* Shi Oingyun 
Protein engineering and Gu 
plant genetics • Chunccheng 
CAAS lnst of Plant Protection Plant disease biology 
CAMS lnst of Blood Research Blood immunity 
CAMS lnst of Capillary Capillary circulation Xiu Rijuan 
Circulation 
CAMS Institute of Tumours Molecular tumours • Wu Min 
CAS lnst of Atmospheric Geo-fluid dynamics 
Physics 
CAS lnst of Chemistry Dynamic spectrum & stable Tang Youqi 
structures 
CAS lnst of Metallurgy Sensor sciences* Wang Shanghai 
Weiqing 
CAS lnst of Physics Super-conductivity 
CAS lnst of Hydro-Biology Freshwater ecology • Liu Jiankang Wuhan 
CAS lnst of Acoustics IT for acoustics* Guan Beijing 
Dinghua 
CAS lnst of Automation Model recognition • Feng Songde 
CAS lnst of Bio Physics Bio-macromoleculars Zou Chenglu 
CAS lnst of Biochemistry Molecular biology • Z.Youshang Shanghai 
CAS lnst of Chemical Physics Catalytic chemistry Wu Youxian Dalian 
CAS lnst of Geochemistry Organic geo-chemistry Guiyang 
CAS lnst of Metals Research Metal fracture & material Wang Shenyang 
deactivation Zhongguang 
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CAS lnst of Optics & Fine Appl1ed opt1cs Mu Gu1guang Chang-chun 
MechaniCS 
CAS lnst of Glaciology Permafrost engmeenng 
Cryopdelogy 
CAS lnst of Organic Chemistry Natural & bio-organ1c Shanghai 
chemistry 
CAS lnst of Physics Env1ronment informat1on Chen Beijing 
systems• Shupeng 
CAS lnst of Physics Atomic physics• Vie Chaohui Wuhan 
CAS lnst of Physics Surface physics • Wang Sheng Beijing 
CAS lnst of Plant Physiology Plant molecular genetics • Xu Zhihong Shanghai 
CAS lnst of Semi-Conductors IC superlattice Chromium-Cr Zheng Houzhi Beij1ng 
CAS lnst of Technical Physics Infrared phys1cs Shanghai 
CAS lnst of Zoology Bio-membrane eng1neering Liu Shusen Beijing 
CAS Sci&tech Univ Information security Beijing 
Central China Univ of Laser technology • Sun Xueyi Wuhan 
Sci& Tech 
Chang Jiang Aquatic Institute Biotech for oil-bearing 
crops* 
Chengdu University High speed hydraulic power Chengdu 
Chongching Univ Mechanical transmission Chong-ching 
Dalian Univ of S& T River bank engineenng Oiu Dahong Dalian 
Fudan University Applied surface physics Chen Ping Shanghai 
Fudan University Genetic engineering • Zheng 
Zhaoxin 
Fudan University Surface optimization Li Fuming 
Human Medical University Medical genetics Changsha 
Institute of Veterinary Biotech for vetennary Lu Jingliang Harbin 
Medicine medicine* 
Jiaotong University Marine engmeering Sheng Zhen Shanghai 
Jiatong University Metal composites Wu Ren1ie 
Jiatong University Structural strength • Shen Yapeng X ian 
Jilin University Enzyme engmeering • Chen Yuhua Chang-chun 
Jiaotong University Dynamics engmeenng X ian 
Lanzhou University Applied organic chem1stry • Liu Youcheng Lan-zhou 
Nanjing University C_omputer software Xu Jaifu Nanjing 
Nanjing University Co-ordination chem1stry You 
Xiaozeng 
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Nanjing Untversity Soltc micro-structure Feng Rui 
physics* 
Nankai University Organic chem1stry * Li Zhengming Tianjin 
Institute of Virus Virus genetic Hou Yunde 
Institute of Virus Virus genetic engineering* Hou Yunde 
Oinghua University Friction research • Wen Shizhu Beijing 
Qinghua University AI systems• Zhou 
Yuanqing 
Qinghua University Chemical engineering 
Qinghua University Optical electronics 
Shadong University Crystal materials • Jiang Minhu Jinan 
Shanghai lnst of Birth Planning Medical tools for birth Shanghai 
control 
Shanghai Tumour lnst Cancer genetics • Gu Jianren 
South China lnst of Tropical Biotech for tropical crops 
Crops 
Trianjin University Engines• Shi Shaixi Tianjin 
Tongji University Civil engineering Zhu Beilong Shaighai 
Wuhan Technical University Synthetic materials Wuhan 
Wuhan University Software• He Xianqing 
Xiaman University Solid surface chemistry Jan Shaowu Xiaman 
Zhejiang University CAD Liang Hangzho 
Youdong 
Zhejiang University Hyperpure silica&silane • Yao Hangzho 
Hongnian 
Zhongshan University Spectroscopies for super Yu Zhenxin Guangzhou 
speed lasers • 
CAS - Chinese Academy of Sciences 
CAAS - Chinese Academy of Agricultural Sciences 
CAMS - Chinese Academy of Medical Sciences 
- denotes key labs already established and operating 
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ANNEX 5 : SSTC MAJOR DEPARTMENTS AND FUNCTIONAL OFFICES 
1. The Science and Technology Department- concerned with with devising policy and 
drafting relevant S& T regulations. 
2. The Forecasting Department- concerned with the analysis of data for the projection 
of future developments. 
3. The Planning Department- a joint department with the State Planning Commission 
promotes co-ordination of the work of the two commissions with respect to linking 
S& T policy to the needs of the economy and society. 
4. The Works Management Department - co-ordinates the work of all the industrial 
ministries as well as the work of CAS relating to specific state S& T projects. This 
department is also concerned with the key R&D projects identified in the five year 
plans. 
5. The Department of New Technologies- now encompasses the various directorates 
that have been set up to oversee the 863 and TORCH programmes, as well 
programmes supporting basic research and the programme of key and open 
laboratories. 
6. The Science and Technology Management Department - is responsible for 
developing and implementing the institutional organizational reform aspects of the 
S& T reform programme. 
7. The Financial Facilities Department - responsible for financial affairs, particularly 
with respect to capital construction. 
8. The Scientific and Technical Cadres Department - responsible for organizing the 
nation's S&T cadres, particularly with regard to the labour policy reform aspects 
of the S&T reform programme. 
9. The Information and Data Department- responsible for data collection and analysis. 
10. The Department of International Scientific and Technical Co-operation- responsible 
for deciding on joint projects and research programmes with foreign countries as 
well as formal S& T exchange programmes. 
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